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“Bound in darkness and idolatry”? Protestant working-class underachievement and unionist hegemony

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Over the past decade or more there has been a growing concern at the levels of educational underachievement within loyalist working-class areas of Northern Ireland. The inability of both educational and social policy initiatives over the past decade to improve the situation in any meaningful way has raised important questions concerning how the problem can be tackled more effectively. Placing the issue within the theoretical framework of Gramsci’s hegemony, this paper argues that there is a need to better understand the historical nature of the problem and to recognise the political and social forces that have shaped its existence. It argues that there is a need to move away from explaining Protestant underachievement simply by the availability of jobs in Ulster’s industrial past and to place its roots in the complex battle for social, political, and economic power since the 1801 Act of Union.

Keywords: educational underachievement; hegemony; Ulster unionism; loyalism; Northern Ireland; Gramsci

Over the past decade or more there has been a growing concern at the levels of educational underachievement within loyalist working-class communities.¹ The failure to address the issue has, at various times, been blamed for many of the social problems that are seen to be impacting these communities and which, more recently, have been suggested as potentially representing “the biggest threat to the current political stability” in Northern Ireland.² Moreover, the inability of both educational and social policy initiatives over the past decade to improve the situation in any meaningful way has raised important questions concerning how the problem can be tackled more effectively.³

Placing the issue within the theoretical framework of Gramsci’s hegemony, this paper argues that there is a need to better understand the historical nature of the problem and to recognise the political and social forces that have shaped its existence. It will be argued that there is a need to move away from explaining Protestant underachievement simply by the availability of jobs in Ulster’s industrial past⁴ and to place its roots in the complex battle for social, political, and economic power, both in Britain and Ireland, following the 1801 Act of Union.

The paper will highlight the political and social forces that helped to define attitudes towards education within working-class Protestant communities and examine how contemporary divisions within unionism continue to determine policy approaches within parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). It will be argued that there remains a reluctance within mainstream unionism to meaningfully address the issue due to a long-held fear that it could lead to new political challenges emerging that would severely weaken a hegemony carefully fostered over at least two centuries.

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In order to examine these issues in detail, it is first of all important to outline briefly the concept of hegemony and its relevance to Protestant working-class underachievement in Northern Ireland.

Gramsci and “cultural hegemony”

Between 1929 and 1935, whilst imprisoned by Mussolini’s fascist regime, the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) wrote what have become known as his *Prison Notebooks*. These were, essentially, Gramsci’s efforts at trying to understand better the relationship between “culture and power under capitalism” as a means of explaining why “workers under advanced capitalism have not behaved the way Marx said they would”. Gramsci sought to analyse how one grouping or class came to exert a control over others around them and why the majority seemed to accept this without challenge. To do so, he developed the concept of “hegemony” which, he argued, “the dominant group exercises throughout society”. Whilst his writings do not necessarily provide a direct definition of hegemony he does describe its outworking as “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (Gramsci, 12).

Central to Gramsci’s analysis was the notion that control over the military and state institutions was not enough to maintain long-term authority but rather there was a need to achieve a considerable measure of consent from amongst various different groupings. According to Gramsci, power could never be static but required its holders to constantly adapt and respond to challenges in such a way that would enable a sufficient degree of consent to prevail. There was, he argued, the need for a measure of “transformism” to take place which necessitated “the formation of an ever more extensive ruling class” (Gramsci, 58) formed out of the “continuous absorption . . . of the active elements produced by allied groups” and that this should include even “those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile” (Gramsci, 59). As such, it was also possible, perhaps desirable, to absorb “the enemies’ élites” which would effectively mean “their decapitation, and annihilation often for a very long time” (Gramsci, 59). Key to a successful hegemony, in this analysis, was the role ascribed to “intellectuals” or, more specifically, those defined as “organic intellectuals”. Gramsci argued that every social grouping created “one or more strata of intellectuals” that served to give that group “homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” (Gramsci, 5). The organic intellectuals who emerged from the working classes helped to provide a crucial link between the ruled and the rulers – a function that had the potential to secure a measure of consent through their ability to represent the needs and interests of the group from which they stemmed (Gramsci, 10). In seeking to incorporate these “organic intellectuals”, and particularly over the longer term, it was essential for the ruling group to make important compromises and even required, in the words of Steve Jones, “a truly hegemonic group or class” to “make large parts of its subalterns’ worldview its own”. Such compromises, however, needed to be carefully managed:

Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential . . . (Gramsci, 161)

The essential referred to here was the nature of the state and, more specifically, the manner in which it protected the interests of the ruling classes. Such an outlook, perhaps
unsurprisingly, made Gramsci very sceptical towards the nature of “parliamentary democracy” as it had emerged since the nineteenth century. In an analysis of the rise of “laissez-faire liberalism”, for example, he emphasised that it merely represented “a fraction of the ruling class which wishes to modify not the structure of the State, but merely government policy”. Consequently, the best that could be hoped for in a parliamentary democracy was “a rotation in governmental office of the ruling-class parties” as opposed to “the foundation and organisation of a new political society, and even less of a new type of civil society” (Gramsci, 160).

In trying to understand more fully the nature of power and its maintenance over the longer term Gramsci moved away from the traditional Marxist analysis that placed power largely within the spectrum of controlling economic resources. He argued that the state needed to be thought of as “a balance between political society and civil society” which allowed for “the hegemony of one social group over the entire nation, exercised through so-called private organizations like the Church, trade unions, or schools”. This highlights the fact that Gramsci viewed educational structures as having an important role to play in the establishment and maintenance of hegemonic power. In particular he identified an increased tendency towards “vocational” schooling as a significant contributing factor, arguing that it created a model of education wherein such schools were reserved for the “instrumental classes” whilst the “classical” schools became the preserve of the “dominant classes and the intellectuals” (Gramsci, 26). The consequence was to “perpetuate traditional social differences” by ensuring that the “instrumental classes” continued to view their role in the democratic sphere as being inherently limited by the false promises of social mobility that laissez-faire liberalism guaranteed. Yet, despite this sense of ingrained educational division between “the dominant classes” and the “instrumental classes”, Gramsci’s wider contribution to the understanding of power dynamics, importantly, allows for a measure of fluidity thanks largely to his concept of the “organic intellectual”. This is perhaps missing in the writings of other analysts such as Pierre Bourdieu, for example, whose concept of *habitus* does not necessarily sit easily alongside the realities of significant social mobility and educational achievement by those within the working classes, particularly as reforms are introduced in order to reduce the potential for radicalism. The reality of such mobility is of particular relevance to this paper given the nature of social and educational transformation that we witness within sections of the Catholic population in Ireland during the nineteenth century and in Northern Ireland between the 1950s and 1990s.

**Hegemony and the politics of reform**

Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony, and in particular the processes in its maintenance, can be identified within British and Irish society in the aftermath of the political union of 1800–01 as demands for political reform intensified and as the political establishment sought to protect its position of power. This was, after all, a period of continued and considerable social, political and economic change due largely to sustained industrial development, the growth of urbanisation and the rapidly rising population. Most of this change was presented in a positive light, supporting as it did, Britain’s rising imperial aspirations that now stretched to all corners of the globe; Britain, despite the obvious setback of losing the American colonies, was the global superpower. Nevertheless, the changes of the period also presented considerable challenges for those in power – both political and religious. The rising population, along with the growth of urban, working-class living, led to increased levels of crime and fears that a social breakdown was in the
offing. Leading the way in the fight against these “immoral” lifestyles, in the first instance, were the Churches that felt particularly threatened within industrial society.\textsuperscript{15} During the latter years of the eighteenth century, and continuing into the nineteenth, they made a significant effort to develop an educational model capable of giving the “children of the poor” a better understanding of the “doctrines of the Bible”.\textsuperscript{16} To facilitate this there was a growth of educating agencies across England, such as the Sunday School Society and “The National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church”, which aimed to deliver a basic education to the working classes but which also helped to place education on the political agenda. This was evident in the efforts made in 1807 to introduce a Parochial Schools system that would provide for two years of “free schooling for all poor children between seven and fourteen years of age, in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and for girls, in addition, needlework, knitting, etc”.\textsuperscript{17}

The proposal proved unpopular, however, particularly within more conservative circles, with one prominent fear centring on the impact it could potentially have upon wider British society. One parliamentarian, Mr Davies Giddy, famously outlined his opposition on the basis that it could lead to the working classes despising

\[\ldots\] their lot in life, instead of making them good servants in agriculture, and other laborious employments to which their rank in society had destined them; instead of teaching them subordination, it would render them factious and refractory \ldots\] it would enable them to read seditious pamphlets, vicious books, and publications against Christianity; it would render them insolent to their superiors \ldots\textsuperscript{18}

Whilst popular education may have been capable of delivering some social benefits its provision needed to be carefully managed to ensure that it did not upset the political establishment.\textsuperscript{19}

This emphasis on carefully managing change was to become a characteristic of British politics throughout the nineteenth century as the governing classes sought to lessen the threat of upheaval in the half-century following the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{20} Importantly, whilst measures such as the 1832 Reform Act can be seen as helping to stave off the potential for wider turmoil, they also required a degree of political compromise to be reached between the established political order and those seeking greater reform and representation within both the middle and working classes.\textsuperscript{21} This willingness of political leaders to implement what were deemed dramatic and far-reaching reforms during the nineteenth century should be viewed as the outworking of a new hegemony within Britain that saw the political establishment protected, but increased, with the middle/lower classes becoming increasingly incorporated into a uniquely British capitalist society by their own choice (Gramsci, 160–1).\textsuperscript{22} This is reinforced by the fact that those politicians pursuing reform often did so less because of political idealism and more from a fear of the repercussions of not taking action.\textsuperscript{23} As Colley has argued of the Whig leaders who successfully secured the Reform Act of 1832, “almost all [were] broad-acred patricians concerned to maintain the political supremacy of their own class”. She maintains that the key motivations behind introducing parliamentary reform were the “fear of revolution if they failed to act, a natural desire to consolidate their power, and – above all – their own brand of patriotism”.\textsuperscript{24}

That successive British governments over the century did implement such reforms, and thus helped to establish a strong hegemonic authority, should not, however, mask the fact that there remained many opposed to such an approach. For these “Ultra Tory” figures\textsuperscript{25} such reforms represented a longer-term threat to Britain and its ever-expanding Empire.\textsuperscript{26} One perceived danger lay in the fact that too much political say was being given to “two day-labourers”\textsuperscript{27} who knew little about the complex world of politics and economy. This is
certainly represented in the early political career of Lord Salisbury who struggled greatly with the political reforms of the mid-nineteenth century and whose legacy would have an impact on Ireland. Like many other Tories of the time, Salisbury opposed Disraeli’s Reform Act of 1867 on the grounds that he opposed democracy which, he feared, would undermine political activity. “Every community”, he argued in 1862, “has natural leaders, to whom, if they are not misled by the insane passion for equality, they will instinctively defer”.28

Such views remained popular in political circles throughout much of the century and greatly influenced how the thorny issue of working-class education would be approached. In stark contrast to other European powers such as France and Germany, England did not seek to establish a “national” model of education but rather continued to contribute financial assistance to voluntary, largely Church run, societies. Andy Green argues that even the reforms of 1870, which went a long way to finally establishing a “national” system, represented nothing more than a “compromise system” between the two opposing camps that had emerged on the issue over the century – one group who wished to defend the status quo and a second who believed that carefully managed change was necessary in order to protect the established order against the growing radicalism of the period.29 Such was the extent of this compromise, however, it failed to address the principal concerns of those calling for meaningful reform in that it “provided neither free nor compulsory education at elementary level” (Green, 302). This hesitancy at implementing change was further evidenced, he argues, in the 1902 Balfour Act which “created the first state secondary schools” but only in a manner that “deliberately preempted the objectives of the working-class in secondary education” by ensuring that “new state grammar schools were kept deliberately separate from elementary schooling to discourage any notion that the majority of children could transfer into secondary education” (Green, 306). The divisions within the system were also augmented by the “limited number of scholarships provided for secondary schools” which, he argues, “meant that the exclusion of the working class from secondary education was still almost total”. Pointing out that the average child “still left school at 13”, Green maintains that the “independent secondary schools remained more elitist than any of their overseas counterparts, reflecting an obsession with caste exclusiveness” (Green, 306). This, of course, largely reflects the observations of Gramsci in his analysis of the separate “vocational” and “classical” systems with their obvious class distinctions.

The political dynamics described here are crucial to understanding the nature of the political conflict surrounding the education debate in Ireland since the nineteenth century. As Green has highlighted, change within the educational system in England and Wales came slow, largely through an unwillingness to interfere in Church control of education, but also a strongly held belief that the state should not become too deeply involved in such provision.30 Yet, despite such scruples for England and Wales and strong opposition from the Irish Established Church, successive British governments decided to adopt a very different approach in Ireland.31 Rather, it was decided to pursue a policy of reform in order to generate greater stability and to encourage Catholic Ireland into the political union.32 This reflected a growing belief in Westminster that if the union was to succeed, and symbolically for the growing British Empire success was essential, it was becoming ever more important to bring Catholic Ireland in from the political wilderness.33 Such a realism was certainly to be found in the conversion of Sir Robert Peel, the then home secretary, to the policy of Catholic emancipation during the mid-1820s – a policy he had fundamentally opposed earlier in the decade on largely religious grounds. His change of heart was based on “the constitutional view of the dangers which might arise from refusing
The granting of Catholic emancipation in 1829 represented the beginnings of a more concerted effort by Westminster to establish hegemony in Ireland and thus strengthen the political union. This would require successive governments to address the principal social concerns of the Catholic community as defined by Church leaders and influential political figures such as Daniel O’Connell. The establishment of the National Education System in 1831 was a hugely important part of this wider policy. Kevin Lougheed, for example, has argued that the establishment of the national schools is an example of Foucault’s “governmentality” which requires that “state power is harnessed through institutions” in order to “manage the conduct of a population”. In Ireland, as elsewhere, state institutions became “central to the creation of normative behaviour”, with schools, in particular, becoming “important instruments of social control, with the education of the lower classes a moral project as well as a matter of state security”. Certainly there is some evidence for this within political circles. Edward Stanley, for example, the chief secretary for Ireland who introduced the new system, told parliament in September 1831 about the importance of dealing with the issue properly as it was a “matter of overwhelming political importance”. Moreover, he warned that “in looking at Ireland with reference to a question of this nature, or indeed with reference to any matter whatever, he could not regard it in any point of view as separate from the empire at large”. The efforts to secure “governmentality”, however, must also be seen within the framework of a new hegemonic order being created on the island. One outcome of the expanded educational provision, after all, was the further enhancement of the Catholic middle classes as a more concerted effort was made to find a better balance between British political society and Irish civil society. This was a move greatly opposed by the existing Ascendancy class who were growing increasingly worried about their status within this new order.

Conflicting hegemonies: Ascendancy interests against Westminster reforms

At a “Great Protestant Meeting” held at the Mansion House in Dublin in January 1832 to oppose the creation of the Board of Education, the Earl of Roden declared the determination of those present to “uphold the Protestant constitution of this country” and “maintain the Protestant state which we have received from our ancestors, and which it is our duty to hand down to our children”. He was keen to highlight the symbolism of changes that had taken place over the previous number of years; reforms that provided evidence of how “the Protestant interests of this country were no longer esteemed worthy of consideration”. Listing a series of recent measures, including the 1829 Catholic Relief Bill, he argued that “Protestant property, Protestant life, and Protestant character” was very much “at stake” and that this had been further reinforced by the new system of education, described as “the most infamous series of insults that could be put upon the Protestants of Ireland”.

For many Irish Protestants the compromises enshrined within the educational reforms ran contrary to Protestantism and, more specifically, the Protestant constitution that they had hoped would be extended to Ireland in a more efficacious manner with the union. For large sections of that community, indeed, the union and Britishness equated to Protestantism and to deviate from promoting the latter was to undermine the former. As such, the priority ought to have been taking measures that would eventually weaken the Catholic Church and allow ordinary Irish Catholics to see the error of their ways. The new national schools system, however, was seen to place the Catholic Church on a more equal footing and actually served to undermine the opportunities for converting. The new
model, with its desire to provide “a system of education, from which would be banished even the suspicion of proselytism” was seen to directly contravene the key objective of educational provision in Ireland, which, according to the Belfast Newsletter, was “to educate the R. Catholics”:

Our object in doing so, and we freely own it, would be their conversion, and we believe that if they were generally educated this is a result that would naturally follow ...

The long-term consequences of the new policy were deemed great, therefore, as can be seen from a public address to the leading Presbyterian Dr Henry Cooke, written by an anonymous “Layman” of the Established Church, who argued that the educational system had for its “design and object the preservation of Romanism in Ireland, and the training up the present and coming generations of our country in the destructive errors of that idolatrous superstition”. Insisting that “Popery must fall” he argued that it was “the duty of every Protestant to strive ... to accelerate its approach”. He maintained, however, that for as long as the “present National System of Education remains, Ireland, humanly speaking, must remain bound in darkness and idolatry. Popery is supported and built up by it at every point.”

By the 1830s there was a growing concern that the political and religious establishment in Ireland was under severe threat from a Westminster (and Whig) government determined not only to placate Irish Catholicism but also to give it a more positive role within the union and Empire. Importantly, the concept of “popular education” was now seen to be a key component of these efforts and, as such, was quickly losing its potential as a proselytising tool and becoming a vital weapon in the armament of the reforming radicals and, of course, the “papists”. In the face of this perceived threat there emerged a growing belief that Irish Protestants needed to stand up for themselves more effectively if they were to fully protect their religious, political and economic interests on the island. As such, we see significant efforts to develop ties with like-minded individuals and organisations in Britain who, as outlined above, feared for their own status amid the wider reforms of the period. In particular we see close ties being developed with the “National Club”, a Gentleman’s society formed by MPs and Lords in London to “defend the Protestant principles of the constitution”, and which launched a nationwide campaign in support of their Irish counterparts. Like the Ascendancy class in Ireland the Club rallied against the new educational arrangements which they claimed, in a series of “Addresses” to the “Protestants of the Empire” published in The Standard, treated Irish Protestants unfairly by preventing “unrestricted access to the Holy Scriptures” – a policy, they argued, that was “the essence of Romanism”. The Committee of the Club put forward an impassioned plea for the government to “cease to encourage the Popish creed” but rather to “foster the Protestant faith” and argued that it was only through such a course of action that real peace would be achieved in Ireland and, ultimately, “security for England”.

Such support gave great encouragement to leading figures within Irish Protestantism that their cause was not yet lost and that there remained an influential body of opinion in Britain willing to support the fight against the continuing reforms of the period. In the months after the formation of the “National Club”, for example, a Belfast Newsletter editorial praised such initiatives and exhorted their perceived value:

The present time is peculiarly productive of schemes for the formation of political associations. Of these, the majority are highly deserving of the approbation of all good men. The Evangelical Alliance – for religion and politics are now so blended in every public question that we must include this admirable society in the number – has in view the highest objects which can affect the temporal interests of the Christian Church. The Protestant Alliance is a justifiable and necessary association for the defence of the religion of the
Reformation and the politics of the Revolution. The same may be said of the National Club. In each of these societies, there is no more exclusive or contracted platform than such as has been rendered to a certain degree limited, by the necessity for the exclusion of the enemies of the religion of the State and the integrity of the Empire. Although this places an important emphasis on the growing sectarian divisions of Ireland there was also a further significant aspect to the development of these new ties with Conservative opinion in England. All of the societies were committed to the protection of a traditional form of socio-religious hegemony based on what Cannadine refers to as a “hierarchy and subordination” model in which the lower orders accepted their social positioning because they had been “allotted to them by the hand of God”. Such a political outlook helped to determine not only attitudes towards Irish Catholicism but also to the ever-expanding Protestant working classes. As in Britain, the onset of industrialisation in Ulster had raised the spectre of class divisions and, as such, there was a need to put in place new mechanisms for maintaining Protestant unity in the face of the rising Catholic threat. Miller argues that this fear of a social divide encouraged the Ascendancy class to reinforce its hegemony and that this was evident in the growth of Hibernian Sunday Schools which helped to advance the “inculcation of religious respectability which was so prominent a feature of nineteenth-century life”. Furthermore, he argues that membership of organisations such as the Orange Order brought “quasi-charitable and material benefits” to “lower-class” Protestants and maintains that “a crucial function of the Orange lodges ... was to insulate its ordinary Protestant members against the dangers of eviction, unemployment, and emigration”. The Order had a further important role to play in building up the unionist hegemony which was perhaps something more subtle than that outlined above and which is more directly related to what Billig describes as “banal nationalism”. Orangeism was to become an important tool in helping to inculcate a “Protestant” narrative of Irish history that emphasised the “loyalty” of its people as defined by their continued acceptance of a social order that had enabled Britain, and Ulster, to become an Empire race – rulers as opposed to ruled. This was achieved, in the main, by emphasising the role played by the established political, social and religious leaderships in protecting “Protestant” interests against a nascent and militant Catholicism. Through institutions such as the Orange Order and associated Working-Men’s Clubs, a more conservative politics was successfully instilled across large sections of the Ulster Protestant population. The nature of this conservatism can be seen from the Ascendancy’s response to Gladstone’s “Franchise Bill” of 1884, which sought to extend the vote to every male householder by incorporating the rural boroughs that had been neglected from the previous reforms of 1867. This was a policy that enjoyed considerable support amongst the working- and rural-class populations of England, Scotland and Wales but in Ulster, in stark contrast, working-class Protestants came out in opposition to the move, with large numbers attending demonstrations against the measure throughout the summer months. At one such demonstration, brought together in support of a move by the House of Lords to reject the Bill, an estimated 20,000 listened to the Right Honourable David Plunket, Conservative MP for Dublin University, declare his opposition to Gladstone’s policy on the grounds that it would give the vote to those incapable of “forming a full and true opinion on political subjects”. Major Edward Saunderson, a prominent Orangeman, Irish Conservative and a future unionist leader, declared his opposition to the Bill because it threatened “a portion of the community that included the education, the wealth, and the loyalty of the land”. Similarly, at a “Conservative Demonstration in Lisburn” organised under the auspices of the “Working Men’s Constitutional Club” held in a local Orange Hall, the Revd Canon Pounden insisted
that the changes proposed “would be a most serious thing for their country”. Arguing that the reforms witnessed over the century had gone far enough, he maintained that “it was the wealth and intelligence of the country that should form the great element in the voice that should send representatives to Parliament”. 55

The views expressed at these demonstrations, and the support obtained from large sections of the population that stood to gain from the reforms, demonstrate the extent to which an Ascendancy hegemony had successfully been established. This was, however, a hegemony characterised by domination, and maintained through the social, economic and religious fears of the community rather than through Gramsci’s “transformism”. The crisis surrounding Home Rule during the 1880s and 1890s merely helped to reinforce this and to cement the dominant position of conservative figures within the Protestant community. It was, however, a hegemony that was continually threatened by Westminster, which continued to advocate policies of conciliation as a means of generating stability in the face of perceived nationalist threats. Matthew argues, for example, that Gladstonian reforms, including his commitment to Home Rule, were born out of a desire to “pacify Ireland, not to liberate it” 56 and maintains that Gladstone’s aim was simply “to draw a line between the Fenians & the people of Ireland, & to make the people of Ireland indisposed to cross it”:

Gladstone seems to have believed that if the Irish were shown the Westminster Parliament redressing their grievances by spectacular acts of legislation, then this would encourage their adherence to the existing political structure, both as to institutions and political parties. 57

Importantly, such a belief was also found at the heart of the unionist government’s Irish policy during the 1890s and early 1900s when it sought, through a series of “popular” reforms, to “kill Home Rule with kindness”. 58 Whilst such an approach was largely welcomed within the Catholic population, attempts at securing local government reform, further efforts at dealing with the land question, and a growing commitment to compromise in the toxic arena of education all helped to further alienate Protestant and backbench unionist opinion. 59

It is important to contextualise the unionist/Conservative government’s Irish policy within the wider political culture of the period which was characterised by a growing belief that British politics was becoming increasingly divided between “the classes” and “the masses”. As Cannadine has highlighted, such a belief led to a repositioning of party politics wherein the Gladstone’s Liberals positioned themselves as the party of the people whilst Lord Salisbury’s Conservatives became the voice of “the classes”. 60 Salisbury’s approach is of particular interest given his growing belief that domination by the masses was an increasing inevitability, leading him to promote the role of the House of Lords as a check on the increasingly radical tendencies of the Commons. 61 This political outlook was later developed by Arthur Balfour, following the unionist government’s dramatic electoral defeat in 1906, who went as far as to argue that “the great Unionist Party should still control, whether in power or opposition, the destinies of this great Empire” by frustrating Liberal aspirations through the careful usage of the House of Lords. 62 Balfour was, of course, a protégé (and nephew) of Salisbury but, importantly, he was also a significant influence in the early political career of Edward Carson who would eventually lead Ulster unionism against the 1912 Home Rule Bill. The two became close friends and allies throughout the 1880s and 1890s and although Carson has often been described as a “Liberal Unionist” 63 the ideological influence of Balfour was to become very much evident as the British constitutional crisis unfolded from 1909. 64 As efforts were made to implement first the “People’s Budget” and later reform of the House of Lords, Carson rose to the fore as a stern critic of the Liberal government, a prominent figure in Conservative/
unionist circles and as a defender of Tory principles. Like both Salisbury and Balfour, Carson had huge concerns that Britain was being driven towards class conflict by radicals and accused Liberal leaders such as Lloyd George and Winston Churchill of putting party interests before those of “the great English nation”. Indeed, when analysing the political contribution of Carson it is important to view him as much an English Tory as an Irish/Ulster unionist and to place his actions throughout the Home Rule crisis within the context of his politicking during the wider constitutional crisis of the period which should, in turn, be seen as part of a much bigger battle for political power in Britain – a battle that had class interests at its heart. We get a sense of this from a speech delivered at a “meeting of Liverpool business men in the Exchange Hotel Banqueting Hall” in October 1909, when Carson declared his belief that Lloyd George’s budget had been “rushed, not for business purposes, but for election purposes” and he condemned the Liberals for having used the popular proposals “for the purpose of appealing to ignorance and class prejudice”. Carson seems to have held the same concerns about “popular politics” that Balfour had and he appears, on face value at least, to have been very uneasy about the type of politics being advanced by the Liberals which continued to give precedence to the voice of the masses over the educated and wealthy of society. For Carson, this wider political crisis of the period required “British pluck”, “British statesmanship” and “British honesty” to rise to the fore and “every weapon available in constitutional conflict” to be employed in order to fight back against the dangerous radicalism of the Liberals. Yet what is also important here is that despite his apparent opposition towards the Liberal Party “appealing to ignorance and class prejudice” he was to have no such qualms about employing similar techniques when it came to rousing working-class support against Home Rule in Belfast from 1911. A fundamental difference between the two was the nature of influence that had been brought to bear on the loyalist working classes and which was later cemented through the militant structures of the Ulster Volunteer Force. Whilst one commentator has described unionism as having become “democratised” throughout the 1905–21 period, it could be argued that, in many ways, the exact opposite had occurred. Whilst the loyalist working classes were certainly pivotal to the anti-Home Rule cause this was very much based upon a strictly conservative agenda wherein loyalist leaders tolerated no dissenting voices from within. This is reflected in the observations of one commentator, in 1913, who opined that

The occasion has been seized to strengthen the conservatism of Ulster – I do not use the word in a party sense. By disciplining the Ulster democracy and by teaching it to look up to them as its natural leaders the clergy and the gentry of the province are providing against the spread of revolutionary doctrine and free thought, so that thus a final settlement of the political question on Unionist lines will not leave the way open for a class conflict within the ranks of Ulster Protestantism itself.

The type of politics espoused by unionist leaders in Ireland was staunchly conservative and elitist and represented a very different form of hegemonic politics than that developed in Britain. Rather than implementing a measure of “transformism” over time, their power structures were maintained through the reinforcement of fears concerning what such a social “transformation” could mean for Ireland: Catholic empowerment. Such politicking was to have a significant bearing on attitudes towards education in the new Northern Ireland established after 1920. Not only did unionist leaders continue to emphasise the “Protestant” character of the state/s (both Northern Ireland and Britain more generally), they also sought to reinforce their conservative ideals surrounding a preferred established “social order” within Protestantism; a political approach that would have a negative legacy on educational attainment within the loyalist working classes.
Education and the loyalist working class – “siege mentality” hegemony

... I am still of the opinion that her answer will disclose, as I have claimed for many years past, that we occupy the lowest place in the British Commonwealth of Nations in regard to the proportion of our school population in receipt of higher education.75

The continued predominance of a conservative ideology at the heart of the Northern Ireland government had a considerable impact upon educational policy as it evolved after 1921. Whilst there was at least some commitment to extending educational opportunities – certainly with the aspiration of aiding industrial growth – this was very much limited in terms of who should be the beneficiaries. As the above quote from Harry Midgley (one of a few Labour-minded unionists to emerge during the inter-war years) suggests, progression through the various academic levels remained limited and largely confined to an elite few. Indeed, Midgley emphasised this further when he declared his belief that education was “the prerogative of those with the big bank balances, and that, too often, many poor children are deprived of a full education simply through the poverty of their parents”.76

The Stormont debate to which Midgley was contributing was exploring the potential for educational reform that would keep Northern Ireland in line with reforms being proposed for England and Wales.77 These reforms stemmed from an increasingly popular view that “secondary education should be no longer regarded as the privilege of a small elite but as the prerogative of all”78 and the growing belief that this required a new system capable of delivering a “common code of regulations for all schools catering for children over the age of 11”.79 The 1944 “Butler Act” was, initially at least, viewed as the outcome of such aspirations through its provision of free secondary education for all young people up to the age of fifteen and, in particular, its “abolition of fee paying in grammar schools”.80 As Watson has argued, the hope was that the new model of education would ensure a new equality of opportunity for all young people, irrespective of their social class, and enable the “previously under-utilized talents of the intelligent working class ... to flourish, reaping economic as well as cultural benefits”.81 Many contemporary commentators now question the impact that these reforms had in producing the desired “meritocracy” and claim that they merely advanced the educational ambitions of the middle classes with only a “very select few” from the working classes benefiting from a grammar school education.82 This has led Todd to conclude that

... selective secondary education ensured that there were very few golden tickets to go round, and most of them went to the children of privileged parents. Many manual workers had high hopes that their children’s opportunities would be greater, and did all that they could to make this possible. But the post-war economy required thousands of assembly-line workers and thousands more to undertake routine clerical work; and successive governments ensured that the education system was tailored to provide them.83

Whilst the inequalities of the system are of huge importance, so too is the existence of the “very few golden tickets”. The symbolism of the perceived opportunities presented by the new educational system, however small they were in reality, became an important cog in the outworking of hegemony in the mid-twentieth century. A new narrative emerged from the reforms that those with the necessary talents and determination would achieve academically, irrespective of their social-class origins.84 The tripartite system, determined by the “scientifically based” 11 + examination, would, it was argued, ensure that children ended up in the educational establishment that best suited their abilities – a characteristic previously identified by Gramsci in his analysis of the vocational/classical schools model.85 Despite the fact that the scientific basis of the system was quickly challenged86 the reforms did help to reinforce the idea that “academic” education was for some and not

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This was further strengthened by the changing nature of the British economy in the years following which saw a rise in the number of people employed in “white collar work”, an increase in general living standards and the perceived “embourgeoisement of the affluent worker”. All of this helped to bring about a new period of Gramsci’s “transformism” that saw increased numbers of young people leave school with qualifications, the middle classes significantly increased and the political elite relatively unscathed.

In Northern Ireland the unionist government, despite major fears about the impact of the Labour government’s socialist policies, decided that there was little option but to implement similar reforms. As such, the 1947 Northern Ireland Education Act largely resembled the 1944 Butler Act by creating free secondary education along tripartite lines. The impact of the reforms has been somewhat mixed and it would appear that the Catholic working classes have benefited more significantly than their Protestant counterparts. Whilst statistics show that Protestant children continued to achieve better results than their Catholic counterparts in the decades following the reforms, they also highlight a continuation in the gap between the different Protestant social classes. Miller et al., in their analysis of “the association between A Level subject combinations, gender, religion and social class of the 1979 cohort of higher education entrants”, found that Catholic students tended to come more from a working-class background whilst Protestant students came from a “service (upper middle) class background”. Osborne et al. have highlighted that by 1985 “three quarters of Protestants (74.8%) came from a non-manual background, compared with half of Catholic entrants (52%)” and that “Catholics actually represent the majority of those coming from manual backgrounds”. To explain this pattern they argue that “the employment opportunities of Protestants from manual backgrounds are better than those of Catholics from the same background” and, as such, higher education was seen as “a major route for potential social mobility for Catholics”. This has subsequently been evidenced in what Breen describes as the “unprecedented rates of upward social mobility” within the Catholic population since 1970.

That such significant levels of mobility were possible is of huge importance and it stems largely from a growing determination within large sections of the Catholic community to bring about social and economic change in the face of both real and perceived discriminatory practices on the part of the unionist government. This was very evident in the early writings of John Hume, who, in an opinion piece in the Irish Times in 1964, identified a desire amongst “the younger generation” of Catholics to deal with “the continued existence ... of great social problems of housing, unemployment and emigration”. In a telling section of the piece he was hugely critical of nationalist politics and politicians for failing to provide constructive leadership for the Catholic community and called for collective, non-political action in order to address the real issues facing the population:

Most people feel that little can really be achieved politically in the existing political stalemate. There exists in the North at the moment a greater wealth of talent – young business men, professional men and graduates – than ever before and there is a growing desire among them to get together to pool these talents and to tackle community problems.

The Civil Rights movement in Northern Ireland reflected this collective determination and served to greatly enhance social capital within the Catholic community which had already been building since the 1950s. Moreover, the proroguing of Stormont in 1972 and the implementation of Direct Rule from Westminster put in place a new political establishment that recognised the need for social and economic reform that might bring...
longer-term stability despite the violence of the period. There was, in other words, a new effort towards “transformism” on the part of Westminster that had been clearly problematic for the Stormont administration.

This enhanced social capital, and the subsequent benefits accrued from that, was lacking within Protestant working-class communities. There was no equivalent emphasis placed on educational achievement either at community or political level, despite the ongoing decline of the “traditional industries”. This has contributed to a significant long-term undervaluing of educational achievement as highlighted by one school principal who serves a Protestant working-class community:

To me, the main reason why the children underachieve is the complete lack of aspirations. And that is lack of aspirations from the child is borne right up through ... our parents absolutely adore their children ... but there is just a lack of value of education.

This lack of ambition was reflected in the small numbers of young people even attempting the 11+ examination. These views were supported by a teacher in the school who drew comparisons with working-class Catholic schools:

About ten years ago a similar community in a Catholic area, they had the tradition that the only way they could get out was through education. So those children were pushed and pushed and pushed and pushed; so children from an area like this would have went [sic] through Queen’s [University] and would now be teachers, solicitors, you know?

In a similar vein, the principal emphasised the role played by the sense of community within Catholic areas as being important and felt this was not as evident in unionist areas.

The legacy of this lack of educational ambition described here is evident in statistics from the Department of Education’s annual “School Leavers Survey” in relation to students entitled to free school meals which continues to show Protestant working-class children underperform. The 2013 release highlighted that

19.7% (116) of Protestant boys entitled to free school meals achieve at least five GCSEs at grades A*–C or equivalent including GCSE English and maths compared with 33.2% (415) of Catholic boys entitled to free school meals. Catholic girls entitled to free school meals (43.8%, 557) outperform Protestant girls entitled to free school meals (32.4%, 182) in achieving at least five GCSEs at grades A*–C or equivalent including GCSE English and maths.

Despite the existence of evidence concerning a historical detachment from education there has been a failure on the part of unionist politicians to address the situation meaningfully. This was emphasised in a 2011 report by a working group investigating “Educational Disadvantage and the Protestant Working-class” which argued, in relation to the controversial issue of academic selection, that while unionist politicians were “quick to laud the notable and undeniable achievements of the grammar system” there was also “insufficient leadership and honesty” in “acknowledging and addressing underachievement”. This failure to “acknowledge and address” the issue has raised questions about the desire of unionist politicians to bring about a change in the educational achievement of the loyalist working classes. The school principal quoted above, for example, described the difficulties encountered in getting political support from unionist politicians for a much-needed expansion and modernisation of the school:

Principal: I have a few educational issues going on within the school at the moment ... Joe Bloggs [anonymised local community leader] and myself are going through Sinn Féin for that.
Interviewer: Right, so the Unionist politicians have been ... Principal: No use. No use, whatsoever.

The principal went on to describe a visit to Stormont, with community representatives, to see Sinn Féin about these ongoing efforts to expand their provision and expressed the
opinion that “there is no point talking to the Unionists ... because they don’t push anything”.103

When asked to explain the reluctance of unionist leaders to tackle the educational problems the principal was unwilling to express an opinion but one narrative that has emerged since the outbreak of violence in the late 1960s is that it stems from a fear that it would lead to a challenge of the political and social ascendancy that has characterised unionism.104 Thus the views expressed by the late loyalist leader David Ervine, who, when reflecting upon the political situation during the 1970s, identified a “process of manipulation in Northern Ireland”:

So what is that manipulation about, what does it really mean, who does well out of that manipulation, who does badly? Big-house Unionism in bed with little-house Unionism, little-house Unionism goes home to its difficulties and big-house Unionism manipulates the difficulties and remains in the big house ... 105

Similar views were also expressed by another high-profile community/loyalist representative who expressed the opinion that

There’s an us and them thing ... I would say that the last thing Unionism wants is educated loyalists. People say to me, that’s the way it has been for forty years, and more. That really annoys me. There’s areas ... that I would call my circuit, my constituency, and there’s no motivation, there’s no ambition, there’s no hope – this is just what you do ... 106

Further reflecting the views of Ervine, this representative also saw the relationship between the unionist parties and working-class loyalists as one of exploitation. When questioned on why “unionism” didn’t want loyalists educated, he stated his belief that

It gave them control. All we were was ... [pause] right, you know, let them eat cake, sort of attitude. You know? ... So many worked in the shipyard, [paraphrasing unionist leaders] “there’s plenty for them to be doing anyway, we don’t need them; we’ve got all the education and all the people we need in the higher echelons, we don’t need these other people”. There was no connection with the grassroots. That has got worse over the years.107

Although there is some evidence to suggest that the issue of educational underachievement is now on the radar of parties such as the DUP and UUP, particularly following the publication of Dawn Purvis’ report,108 this has not resulted in any substantive policy proposals. Moreover, for some, their unwillingness to engage in a meaningful debate concerning the legacy of academic selection is further evidence of a lack of commitment to addressing the underachievement issue. Billy Hutchinson, leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) which has started to build an increased profile in some loyalist working-class areas, maintains that “[o]ther Unionist Parties do not take the issue [underachievement] seriously”109 and argues that there is a need for debate on the current educational system. The PUP campaigns for academic selection at fourteen (rather than eleven) and for grammar school intake to be “capped as a way of providing a more socially balanced intake to the non-selective schools”.110 Such proposals very much set them apart from mainstream unionist parties who continue to unequivocally support academic selection and the grammar school sector. This stance, it has been suggested, is merely a reflection of the social hierarchy model upon which unionism has historically been built wherein there are those to rule and those to be ruled.

Conclusion
The concept of popular education has long been a complex issue for those advocating political continuity and stability. Although vital to industrial interests there has always been a fear that it could contribute to the lower orders challenging the political
establishment. This has been very much evident in Ireland where the minority Protestant Ascendancy class feared the repercussions that “National education” would have on their status. Traditionally, the focus has tended to be on how such a policy would impact relations between Catholic and Protestant but this paper has highlighted a further significant legacy of this debate – the negative impact that it has had on the Protestant working classes. Applying Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, the paper has argued that the Protestant Ascendancy has used the religious and sectarian divisions to shore up its political base and to advance a conservative form of politics that espoused a “natural” social order. In so doing they successfully created a cultural outlook based around the principle that education was for some and not for others. The effects of this are manifested most clearly in the high levels of educational underachievement evident within loyalist working-class communities and particularly amongst young men. If the issue is to be addressed more effectively in the years ahead there needs to be a greater determination on the part of unionist leaders to bring about change and this can only happen when they come to recognise the role played by the unionist hegemony in helping to create this significant cultural deficit.

Notes
1. See, for example, Purvis et al., Educational Underachievement; Collins et al., Participation Rates in Further and Higher Education.
2. McAdam, “We Have to Deal with the Root Causes of the Problems.” This has seemingly been reinforced by the conflict which arose following the decision by Belfast City Council to fly the union flag only on designated days. See, for example “Union Flag Dispute: Riot Breaks Out in East Belfast,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21020296. See also Nolan, Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report.
3. See “Forgotten Lands’ series in Belfast Telegraph, July 25–26, 2011. The education system in Northern Ireland tends to be divided along religious lines. The vast majority of Protestant working-class children will attend a state school which will have a predominantly Protestant student profile.
4. McAdam, “Slow Demise of Trade Apprenticeships Left Working Class Stranded.” There has been a greater academic focus on the wider social and economic causes of working-class detachment from education over the past decade (see, for example, Connolly and Healy, “Symbolic Violence”; Ingram, “Working-class Boys”; Ingram, “Within School”) but the “popular” explanation remains that of industrial decline.
5. Lears, “Concept of Cultural Hegemony,” 567; see also Coates, Context of British Politics.
6. Gramsci, Selections, 12. Further references will be cited parenthetically.
7. For a wider discussion on this see Jones, Antonio Gramsci.
8. Ibid., 45.
9. Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 43; See also Riley, “Hegemony and Democracy.”
11. See, for example, Bourdieu, “School as a Conservative Force”; also Goldthorpe, “Habitus and Social Inequalities in Education.”
12. Hobsbawm, Age of Revolution.
13. Colley, Britons.
14. Cannadine, Class in Britain; Knight, Nineteenth Century Church; Gilbert, Religion and Society; Guttsman, British Political Elite.
15. Hempton, Religion and Political Culture; McCann, Popular Education.
17. Reisner, Nationalism and Education, 239.
20. Evans, Forging of the Modern State; Philp, French Revolution and British Popular Politics.
21. Colley, Britons; Evans, Forging the Modern State.
22. See also Feuchtwanger, “Conservative Party and Reform,” 289–304.
23. Acemoglu and James, “Why Did the West?,” 1167–99; Cannadine, Class in Britain.
25. Ibid., 335.
28. Quoted in Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World, 73.
29. Green, Education and State Formation. Further references will be cited parenthetically.
31. Coolahan, Irish Education; Akenson, Education and Enmity; Atkinson, Irish Education.
32. Bew, Ireland.
33. Connolly, Religion and Society.
34. Quoted in The Times, March 6, 1829. See also Peel, Memoirs.
37. Quoted in Belfast Newsletter, January 20, 1832.
39. See Kumar, “Nation and Empire,” 593. Kumar argues that modern Ulster Protestants, because of their continued emphasis upon the Protestant constitution, are “the most, and also perhaps the last, British people”.
40. See, for example, the contribution of Dean Burgh to the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Primary Education, Ireland: vol. I (Dublin, 1870), 68.
42. “Our Plan of National Education,” Belfast Newsletter, April 6, 1832.
43. A Protestant Layman, The Error of the Synod of Ulster in Joining the National Board Addressed to Rev. Henry Cooke, DD, LL.D (Belfast, 1842), 5.
44. Holmes, Henry Cooke.
45. W.H. Bellamy on behalf of the committee of the National Club, “Address to the Protestants of the Empire,” The Standard, November 30, 1848.
47. Cannadine, Class in Britain, 62.
49. Billig, Banal Nationalism.
50. Loughlin, “‘Imagining Ulster.’”
51. See views expressed by Niven, Orangeism.
52. Cannadine, Class in Britain; Kirk, Change, Continuity and Class.
53. Quoted in Belfast Newsletter, August 11, 1884.
54. Ibid.
55. Quoted in Belfast Newsletter, August 30, 1884.
56. Matthew, Gladstone, 501.
57. Ibid., 194.
60. Cannadine, Class in Britain, 108–10; see also Kirk, Change, Continuity and Class.
61. For a detailed discussion see Weston, “Salisbury and the Lords.”
63. See Lewis, Carson; Stewart, Edward Carson.
64. For a discussion on the wider crisis see McLean, 1909 Budget; Pugh, “People’s Budget.”
65. Gailey, “King Carson.”
69. See, for example, Letter to the Editor published in The Times, September 29, 1909.
70. Walker, History of the Ulster Unionist Party; Collins, Nationalism and Unionism.
71. See Jackson, “Irish Unionism,” 35.
72. Part III of “Ulster To-day: Impressions of Travel” piece by “Special Correspondent” published in The Times, May 9, 1913. “Special Correspondent” was J.M. Hone. Thanks to Mr Nicholas Mays, Archivist with News International Archive and Record Office.
73. Akenson, *Education and Enmity*.
76. Ibid.
78. McCulloch, *Failing the Ordinary Child*, 49.
80. Sanderson, “Education and Social Mobility,” 375; see also Watson, “Education and Opportunity.”
82. Ibid.
83. McCulloch, *Failing the Ordinary Child*, 49.
84. See, for example, ibid., 216–19.
86. Simon, “1944 Education Act.”
88. Sanderson, “Education and Social Mobility,” 383; Goldthorpe et al., *Affluent Worker*; Reay “Finding or Losing Yourself?”
91. See, for example, ibid., 216–19.
93. Simon, “1944 Education Act.”
94. See Dorling et al., *Poverty*.
95. Akenson, *Education and Enmity*, 10; see also Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson, *Northern Ireland*.
99. See Breen, “Social Mobility,” for discussion of this mobility.
100. Hume, “Northern Catholic: I.”
102. McGrath, *Catholic Church; Farren, Politics of Irish Education*.
103. See, for example, Wichert, *Northern Ireland*, 180–5.
104. Interview with author, June 27, 2013.
105. Ibid.
106. Purvis et al., *Educational Underachievement*, 16.
107. Interview with author, June 27, 2013.
110. Ibid.

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