Almost all the conferences, op-eds and speeches this past April that commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (the Agreement) pointed out that the full promise of the Agreement has yet to be realized.  There is much truth in this argument.  The governmental institutions set up by the Agreement have been paralyzed by political instability for many years, paramilitary groups continue to operate, and Northern Ireland remains a divided society.

Despite all of this, the Agreement has kept the peace for twenty-five years.  There was a time in the early 1990’s after the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords (which won the Nobel Peace Prize for Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat) when many observers predicted that there would be peace in the Middle East before there would be peace in Northern Ireland.  For reasons that historians and political scientists will debate for years to come, leaders in Northern Ireland chose to go down one path while those in the Middle East decided to follow another course.

In light of the Hamas-Israel conflict, the Agreement seems an even more impressive accomplishment.  The Hamas-Israel conflict is a stark reminder of the fate that Northern Ireland avoided.  Despite all its imperfections and unrealized promises, the Agreement has, to paraphrase Seamus Heaney, provided a space in which hope can grow.

It is only natural to wonder if there is some learning from the Northern Ireland peace process that we can apply to the Middle East. When asked this question at Queen’s in April, Senator Mitchell was quick to point out that all conflicts are different and that you cannot take a strategy or tactic that worked in one place and apply it to another situation.  In general, I agree completely with Senator Mitchell.  However, there is one thing that I think we can say worked in Northern Ireland that would work in the Hamas-Israel conflict and that is the belief that peace is possible.

Throughout the multi-year negotiations that led to the Agreement, there were certainly many low points when the outlook was grim.  Despite all of this, the parties believed that peace was possible.  They fought hard against despair when giving up might have seemed to be the logical thing to do.  As President Kennedy pointed out in June of 1963, this is a dangerous point of view because it leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable.

So, the one thing I think could be transferred to the Middle East from Northern Ireland is the idea that seemingly intractable conflicts can be solved.  Implacable foes may not agree to go to have their children go to the same schools or generally participate in an integrated society, but they can agree to stop killing each other.  The Agreement is an example of successfully ending politically motivated violence.  Despite all its flaws, the Agreement is a beacon of hope to a world that desperately needs it.

Martin is a postgraduate student on the Masters degree programme: Conflict Transformation and Social Justice.  His dissertation focuses on The Politics of Persuasion:  How the Irish Republican Leadership Sold the 1998 Good Friday Agreement to their Constituency.