One explanation of the strategic failure of international intervention in Afghanistan 2001 – 2021 was that together the national authorities and their international partners failed to develop security forces which could be sustained from Afghanistan’s own resources.  This episode considers the Taliban’s claim to have achieved in three years what the US, NATO and the Republic failed to achieve in 20 years.

Since the foundation of the Taliban Movement in 1994, it has acted as an armed ideological force. Fighters in the insurgency did not receive salaries.  Rather, commanders raised resources from the local economy and received an expense account from the high command, enabling them to cover their fighters’ basic expenses.  Much of the fighting force was part-time and commanders often ran up large debts with shopkeepers in their areas of operation.

In contrast, the US and NATO spent twenty years trying to build a professional army with modern equipment and most of the specialisations you would expect in a rich country’s security forces.  The Republic’s security spending was thus way beyond the government’s financial capabilities.  The Afghan government depended on financial assistance from the US, EU and others to keep its army, police and intelligence service in the field.  The NATO plan to train and equip the security forces was still incomplete when the US signalled the withdrawal.  Then the world witnessed how, after the intense fighting of the insurgency, those expensive security forces melted away in the final stages of the Republic.

The episode considers whether the Taliban have really achieved the golden grail of security forces development - An effective force sustained by the national exchequer?

Interested readers can also consult the latest journal article on the Taliban’s management of the public finance, by Hamoon and Tawwokoli 2024. This estimates that security expenditure amounts to 44% of the last annual budget.

Podcast produced by Colm Heatley.