Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as GPS or Galileo have become an integral part of many systems, particularly in the aerospace and shipping sectors. However, as public GNSS signals are openly broadcast to low-powered devices without any in-built authentication mechanism, they are susceptible to malicious spoofing (creating false signals) or meaconing record-and-replay type attacks that can send end-users off course.

The DEFCON (Dynamic tEstbed For seCur Open service Navigation) project¹s objective is the extensive analysis, design, and implementation of a full software test-bed that enables validation of a number of authentication concepts which can provide secure GNSS-based navigation to open service users. The aim of these concepts is to prevent both spoofing and meaconing attacks, with various security/performance trade-offs being explored given the particular constraints inherent to GNSS systems. It is an ESA funded collaborative project in conjunction with QASCOM, Italy; CODC, Ireland and Universität der Bundeswehr, Munich, Germany.  The CSIT applied cryptography team is leading the development of the authentication methods.