Robin McKenna (University of Liverpool), “New Scepticism”

While traditional forms of scepticism (Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, Humean) differ in many ways, they share some common features. In particular, they are motivated “from the armchair”, typically arise in the context of first-personal reflection on our beliefs and judgements, and are meant to demonstrate the impossibility of something (e.g. knowledge of the external world). In this talk I discuss a “new” form of scepticism that is motivated by empirical work in social psychology on the influence of biases and motivated reasoning on human cognition. This form of scepticism differs from traditional forms in that it is motivated by empirical investigations into the causes of our beliefs and judgements and is meant to demonstrate the contingent fact that many of our beliefs aren’t justified. My main aims in this talk are, first, to sketch how I think “new sceptical arguments” are best understood and, second, to explain why I think “new scepticism” is both theoretically interesting and practically important.

Contact Suzanne Whitten (suzanne.whitten@qub.ac.uk) for link.