This paper develops a novel theory and provides systematic empirical evidence on the phenomenon of autocratic revolving doors – the process by which former autocratic elites leverage their political connections, experience and skills to return to office in new democracies. Previous research has documented the return of autocratic elites in new democracies, but most evidence relies on country aggregate indicators, anecdotal evidence and case studies, is limited to Latin America and to the trajectory of political leaders. Moreover, there are theoretical arguments on the conditions under which elites are likely to survive democratization, but we still lack systematic evidence for which elites come back and a valid measure that captures their comeback in democracies. Against this background, the paper offers novel theoretical propositions on how the characteristics of cabinet positions in autocracies shapes autocratic revolving doors, distinguish between pathways of return and uses novel measures to offer systematic, cross-national evidence from 66 new democracies between 1966 and 2015. The results indicate that being part of the core autocratic cabinet and having a more prestigious portfolio increases the likelihood of return to democratic politics for elites. In contrast, a longer time spent in an autocratic cabinet and being in charge of the repressive apparatus decreases likelihood of return to democratic politics for autocratic elites.