What do voters in Northern Ireland think about the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland / Windsor Framework ?

 

David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward ^[1]

June 2024

 

This report is available to download here: 

 

Executive Summary

• The impact the Safeguarding the Union deal had in tempering negative views of the Protocol/Windsor Framework appears to have already been reversed.
  • 52% of respondents regard the Protocol/Windsor Framework as overall ‘a good thing for Northern Ireland’. This is slightly lower than in the three previous polls in June and October 2023 and February 2024.
  • 51% see the Protocol/Windsor Framework as an appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit on Northern Ireland. This is a significant drop from 60% in February 2024 and back to pre-Windsor Framework levels.
  • The proportion of those who ‘strongly disagree’ that the Windsor Framework is, on balance, ‘a good thing’ has returned to the level it was before Safeguarding the Union (24%).
  • There has been a drop in support for the Windsor Framework from both ‘slightly unionist’ and ‘strongly unionist’ respondents.
  • 34% of respondents disagree that the Protocol/Windsor Framework is overall a ‘good thing’ for Northern Ireland. This is down on 29% in February 2024 and almost back to the level in October 2023 (35%).
  • 35% of respondents disagree that the Protocol/Windsor Framework provides appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit in Northern Ireland. This is down on 29% in February 2024 and back to the level in October 2023 (35%).
  • A majority of respondents (57%) believe the Safeguarding the Union deal was oversold; only 16% disagree. This includes 80% of respondents identifying as ‘strongly unionist’.
• Views on the political impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework remain less negative than they have been previously; most positive views are on its economic consequences.
  • Voters continue to view the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on political stability in Northern Ireland as being more negative (46%) than positive (35%). The gap has widened since February 2024 (37% positive, 43% negative), but remains significantly narrower than in October 2023 (24% positive, 55% negative).
  • 54% of respondents think the Protocol/Windsor Framework is having a positive impact on the Northern Ireland economy; 28% disagree.
  • 68% continue to think the Protocol/Windsor Framework offers unique opportunities that could benefit Northern Ireland.
  • More voters now see the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market as negative (42%) rather than positive (33%), a clear reversal of the situation in February 2024 (41% positive, 34% negative). In October 2023 views were equally split (39%).
  • More voters now see the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland’s constitutional place in UK as negative (45%) rather than positive (22%). The gap is considerably wider than in February 2024 (37% negative, 30% positive), and indeed October 2023 (43% negative, 29% positive).
  • Respondents are evenly split on whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework is currently having a positive (37%) rather than negative (37%) impact on UK-EU relations. This contrasts with the view in February 2024, when more regarded the impact as positive (42%) than negative (31%)
  • The positive impact of Safeguarding the Union has also dissipated around views on British-Irish relations. In February 2024, voters were evenly split on whether the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on these relations was positive (37%) or negative (37%); today most see the current impact as negative (41%) rather than positive (31%).
• There continue to be mixed levels of trust/distrust in political actors and institutions to manage Northern Ireland’s interests with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • The UK Government is by far the most distrusted (85%) and least trusted (3%) of all actors. The figures are the worst recorded across our polls with the improvement in the figures seen in October 2023 (77% distrust, 7% trust) now reversed.
  • Voters currently trust (45%) slightly more than they distrust (40%) the European Commission/EU, although the gap is narrower than in June 2023 (49% trust, 41% distrust).
  • Northern Ireland business representatives continue to be the actors most trusted (56%) to manage Northern Ireland’s interests with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework; only 18% of respondents distrust them.
  • Also enjoying the trust of a majority of respondents (51%) are civic society groups (e.g. trade unions); 29% distrust them to manage Northern Ireland’s interests with respect to the Windsor Framework.
• Self-declared understanding of the Protocol/Windsor Framework remains high, with a substantial majority of respondents (66%) claiming ‘a good understanding’.
  • Just under half (47%) of respondents say that reliable information is available on the Windsor Framework (down from 54% in February).
• Respondents are keen to see voices from Northern Ireland heard on the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • A strong majority of respondents agree that it is important that business (86%) and civic society groups (66%) in Northern Ireland have their voices heard on the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • Two thirds of respondents (66%) would like to see the restored North-South Ministerial Council used as a forum to discuss how the effects of Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework on the island of Ireland can best be managed.
  • Voters are split on whether MLAs should attempt to use their powers to block changes to EU legislation applicable in Northern Ireland regardless of the political or practical consequences. Around half (49%) think MLAs should not do so; 36% of respondents believe they should. Respondents identifying as ‘strongly unionist’ are particularly in favour of the use of such mechanisms as the ‘Stormont Brake’ (77%).
• The Protocol/Windsor Framework is an important consideration for most respondents when it comes to their voting intentions. However, in comparison to other political/policy issues, it is not a major concern for most.
  • Only a quarter of respondents (23%) say that a candidate’s position on the Protocol/Windsor Framework will not determine whether they will vote for them if there were a Northern Ireland Assembly election in the next six months. It matters least for ‘slightly unionist’ respondents.
  • More than half of respondents say that a candidate’s position on the Protocol/ Windsor Framework will determine whether they vote for them in the upcoming UK General Election. 33% will only vote for candidates supportive of the Protocol/ Windsor Framework; 30% will only vote for candidates who are critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • Three quarters of respondents (74%) identifying as ‘strongly unionist’ will only vote for candidates critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; a majority of nationalists will only vote for candidates who are supportive; ‘slight unionists’ are evenly split (21% for critical candidates, 21% for supportive candidates).
  • The effects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework rank low among voters’ current concerns, with only 3% of respondents placing it as their top concern in a list of ten and 21% putting it in their top three; 53% put it among their lowest three concerns out of the ten listed.
• On the future of the Protocol/Windsor Framework:
  • Most respondents (57%) again want MLAs to vote in favour of the continued application of Articles 5-10 of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; a third (32%) want MLAs to vote against (the second lowest proportion to date).
  • Three quarters of respondents (75%) believe the UK and EU should pursue closer relations under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) to reduce further the need for formalities, checks and controls on the movements of goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and the EU market. Thus includes a clear majority of respondents across unionist, nationalist and ‘neither’ communities.
  • Most respondents believe pragmatism (58%) rather than principle (21%) should determine whether the UK follows EU rules as part of a closer relationship with the EU.
  • 58% of respondents expect a new UK government after the General Election to pursue relations with the EU to the benefit of Northern Ireland.

Introduction

As part of an extended ESRC-funded research project on the implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, a series of regular polls has been commissioned to ‘temperature test’ voter attitudes on a range of issues relating to Brexit and the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, and their implications for Northern Ireland (NI). This is the only polling in Northern Ireland dedicated to the topic of the Protocol (now generally known as the ‘Windsor Framework’) and which has been running at regular intervals since the Protocol entered fully into force on 1 January 2021.

The polls are being conducted every four months during 2021-2024 by LucidTalk using its online Northern Ireland Opinion Panel. LucidTalk have a strong track-record of accurately predicting election and referendum results in Northern Ireland on the basis of polling this Opinion Panel. The results presented here are from a sample of 1016 responses (from a total of 2415 responses) to the poll undertaken on 31 May – 3 June 2024. The sample used is weighted to be representative of the adult population of Northern Ireland (e.g. by age, gender, region). All results presented are accurate to a margin of error of +/-2.3% at 95% confidence.

The context for this poll

This eleventh poll was conducted more than three years after the end of the 11-month transition period that followed the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020. Most of our earlier polls were conducted in a context of ongoing contestation and political tensions around the Protocol and often strained UK-EU relations. The context for more recent polls has been significantly improved UK-EU relations. This followed the adoption of the Windsor Framework in February 2023 which introduced a ‘Stormont Brake’ on amendments and replacements to certain EU laws applicable in Northern Ireland, revised arrangements for the movement of retail goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and for the supply of medicines, together with new implementation milestones.

Since then, the existing joint EU-UK bodies overseeing implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework have been meeting regularly, new bodies have been established, and joint commitments to stakeholder engagement put in place. Some issues concerning the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework still have to be addressed, however (e.g. on the supply of veterinary medicines into Northern Ireland once the current ‘grace period’ expires at the end of 2025). Concerns around the Protocol/Windsor Framework, particularly among unionist voters, have persisted.

Various of these concerns appeared to have been sufficiently addressed in the Safeguarding the Union ‘deal’ that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreed with the UK Government in January 2024 and which led to the DUP supporting the return of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the establishment of a new Northern Ireland Executive. On 3 February 2024, the NI Assembly convened and elected a Speaker and on the same day Michelle O’Neill (Sinn Féin) and Emma Little-Pengelly (DUP) were sworn in as First and deputy First Minister respectively and a new Executive was formed. The return of the NI Assembly also meant the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee could be established and begin its work.

The Safeguarding the Union deal included new commitments regarding Northern Ireland’s position within the UK and actions to deliver on them. These included: new internal UK bodies and structures (e.g. a UK East-West Council); government departments giving ‘special regard to Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market’ when bringing forward regulation; a UK Government commitment to 'no unnecessary checks within the UK internal market’; and a UK Internal Market Guarantee aiming to ensure that at least 80% of GB-NI freight movements go through the ‘UK Internal Market System’ (previously called the ‘green lane’). Legislation has since been adopted implementing most of the commitments.

Of particular significance for MLAs now back at Stormont is legislation providing for the Stormont Brake on amendments and replacements to EU law applicable under the Protocol/Windsor Framework and for ‘applicability motions’ on whether new EU legislation can be added to it. Although no attempt has yet been made to trigger the Stormont Brake, two ‘applicability motion’ debates have been held: the first motion was rejected; the second passed. And the UK Government has also legislated for an earlier independent review of the Protocol/Windsor Framework if there is only a simple (i.e. not cross-community) majority endorsing its continued application in the Assembly’s democratic consent vote towards the end of 2024. The ‘applicability motion’ debates, as anticipated, provided opportunities for supporters, critics, and opponents to rehearse their positions on the Protocol/Windsor Framework.

There are two other significant political developments that are important for the context for this poll. The first is the resignation of Sir Jeffrey Donaldson as the leader of the DUP. Thus, within two months of announcing the Safeguarding the Union deal and leading the DUP back into power-sharing, Donaldson was replaced by Gavin Robinson. Given Donaldson’s prominent role in negotiating and then championing the deal, opponents of it took the opportunity to renew their rejection of ‘Donaldson’s deal’. Although there was no obvious wavering within the party about the wisdom of remaining in the NI Executive, when Robinson began to raise even small doubts about the deal – admitting that the DUP ‘oversold it’ – this was inevitably seen as indicating some weakness in the DUP’s support for it. Robinson has only expressed such views since he was officially confirmed as DUP party leader and since the announcement by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of a UK general election on 4 July. This perhaps hints at concern that the party is wary of the impact that their support for the Safeguarding the Union deal will have on their election prospects. The results of this poll do indeed indicate that the positive impact that the deal had on unionists’ views of the Windsor Framework has already dissipated.

Participants in the poll on 31 May – 3 June 2024 were asked six sets of questions and offered the opportunity to provide written comments in response to the poll. The questions covered attitudes towards Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework, assessments of the latter’s impact, and views on its relative importance compared to other current issues of concern (e.g. the state of the economy, health and social care provision). As in previous polls, participants were asked to indicate how much they trust different actors to manage Northern Ireland’s interest regarding the Protocol/Windsor Framework, and how they would like MLAs to vote in the ‘democratic consent’ vote at the end of 2024. They were also asked how important the Protocol/ Windsor Framework would be for their voting preferences in a future NI Assembly election and the UK general election on 4 July. A final section sought views on further questions concerning the Windsor Framework and the future of UK-EU relations as well as the Safeguarding the Union deal.

Attitudes to Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework

This latest polling continues to show most voters in Northern Ireland as either generally accepting or supportive of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. However, opinion remains divided, with continued opposition among many unionists to its arrangements regardless of the Safeguarding the Union deal. The slight warming to the Protocol under the Windsor Framework (as seen in the June 2023 poll) continues to be reflected in several of the findings of this latest poll, but on some questions levels of support have dropped compared to previous Testing the Temperature polls, and in some instances have returned to pre-Windsor Framework levels. Opposition to the Protocol/Windsor Framework remains firm among around a third of respondents, who predominantly self-identify as ‘strongly unionist’.

Two thirds of respondents (66%) claim a ‘good understanding’ of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (see Figure 1), although this is down on previous polls (e.g. 74% in October 2023). Also lower is the proportion of respondents (47%) who think that reliable information exists on the Protocol/Windsor Framework. In our two previous polls more than half of respondents (54%) thought that reliable information exists. This suggests a resurgent wariness of information on the topic, and it corresponds with the finding that 57% of respondents believe the Safeguarding the Union deal was oversold. The latest figure is more in line with views in 2022 (44-47%), yet above the 37% lowest level recorded in March 2021.

Figure 1. Opinion of Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

 

Almost three-quarters of respondents (72%) continue to agree that ‘particular arrangements’ for Northern Ireland are needed to manage the effects of Brexit. The proportion of all respondents being strongly of this view (51%) is the highest recorded to date in our polls.

The narrow majority (51%) who agree or strongly agree that the Protocol/Windsor Framework – now with the UK Government’s Safeguarding the Union deal with the DUP – provides an appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit for Northern Ireland has fallen markedly from 60% (February 2024) and slightly lower than the 53-54% in previous polls (when the question focused on the Protocol with the ‘grace periods’).

A majority of respondents (52%) continue to regard the Protocol with the Windsor Framework as ‘on balance, a good thing’ for Northern Ireland, although the figure is down on the 55-56% figures seen in the last three polls (June and October 2023 and February 2024) (see Figure 2). Indeed, it is back down to pre-Windsor Framework levels, although still above the lowest recorded level in June 2021 (43%). As in February 2024 most overall ‘agree’ respondents ‘agree’ rather than ‘strongly agree’. For those disagreeing with the proposition, the overall figure is back up to 34% (as in October 2023) having dropped to 29% in February 2024. It remains lower than the immediate pre-Windsor Framework figure in February 2023 (41%). The impact of Safeguarding the Union in tempering some opposition to the Protocol/Windsor Framework has been reversed.

 

Figure 2. The Protocol/Windsor Framework is on balance ‘a good thing’ for Northern Ireland (%)

 

On whether Brexit itself is on balance ‘a good thing for the UK’, there continues to be a clear majority (66%) who disagree. This remains higher than in the polls conducted in 2023 (e.g. 60% in October). The majority (57%) strongly of that opinion is the largest across our polls to date.

Majority acceptance of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework is also reflected in responses to the question on whether the Protocol provides Northern Ireland with a ‘unique set of post-Brexit economic opportunities compared to the rest of the UK which, if exploited, could benefit Northern Ireland’. Just over two thirds of respondents (68%) continue to agree that there are economic opportunities to be had from the Protocol/Windsor Framework. The figure – as in June 2023 and February 2024 – is the highest it has been since our first poll in March 2021. Just under a quarter of respondents (24%) disagree there are economic opportunities, so in line with the lower end of the range in previous polls (23-34%).

Views on the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework

The poll asked respondents for their assessment of the current impact of the Protocol/ Windsor Framework being implemented (see Figure 3). Important to note here is that the phased implementation of the Windsor Framework removes the ‘grace periods’ for the application of some of the Protocol’s provisions and replaces them with new ‘green lane’/Internal Market System arrangements for reducing/removing formalities, checks and controls on the movement of goods into Northern Ireland from Great Britain.

On the question of the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on the economy of Northern Ireland, over half of respondents (54%) currently view it as positive (slightly down on 56% in February but up on 50% in February 2023); 28% view the impact as negative (it was 29% in February 2024 and 32% in October 2023). Respondents are clearly divided along identity lines. While the clear majority of ‘strongly unionist’ voters (65%) continue to view the impact as negative, the proportion of ‘slightly unionist’ voters viewing the impact as positive has declined since February 2024 (50%) although they remain more positive (41%) than negative (32%). In October 2023 they were evenly split. Less than 5% of nationalist and only 10% of ‘neutral’ voters view the impact as negative.

When it comes to Northern Ireland’s relationship with the rest of the UK, the impact of the Safeguarding the Union deal noted in February 2024 has evaporated. Whereas in February 2024, for the first time, more voters regarded the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market as positive (41%) than negative (34%), this is no longer the case: currently only 33% regard the impact as positive and 42% see it as negative (the highest since the Windsor Framework, although still much below the high of 60% in October 2021). The clear majority of ‘strongly unionist’ voters (80%) continue to view the impact as negative (up from 70% in February). The Safeguarding the Union deal saw ‘slightly unionist’ voters move from viewing the impact on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK Internal Market in October 2023 as negative (50%; positive 26%) to the plurality seeing it as positive (44%, to 38% negative) in February. Just four months on, 53% of ‘slightly unionist’ voters see its impact as negative and 26% see its impact as positive. More than three quarters of nationalist and ‘neutral’ voters continue to view the impact as either positive or neutral in this regard.

Views on the impact of the Windsor Framework in political terms have typically been more negative. The proportion of respondents seeing the Protocol’s current impact as negative on Northern Ireland’s constitutional position in the United Kingdom (45%) has risen markedly since February 2024 (37%) and is back above the level of the two previous polls (43%).

In previous polls, a majority of respondents (54-68%) saw the Protocol/Windsor Framework impacting negatively on political stability in Northern Ireland, the figure is now at 46% (although up slightly from 43% in February 2024). Only 35% of respondents believe that the Windsor Framework is having a positive impact on political stability in Northern Ireland.

The latest polling confirms the more positive views on the Protocol’s impact on British-Irish and UK-EU relations that have been present since the Windsor Framework was adopted. In February 2023, a majority of voters viewed the impact of the Protocol as negative (British-Irish relations – 58%; UK-EU relations – 57%). With the Windsor Framework, the figures for negative impact on UK-EU and British-Irish relations went down to 37% and 31% respectively (February 2024). In the latest poll, these figures have risen slightly to 41% and 37%. The proportion of voters (31%) perceiving the impact of the Windsor Framework on British-Irish relations to be positive (31%) is noticeably lower than a year ago (43% in June 2023).

Figure 3. Overall assessment of the current impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

 

Most respondents continue to view the Protocol/Windsor Framework as having a positive impact on protecting the 1998 Agreement. Currently, 49% are of this view, so in line with the June 2023 and June 2022 polls (both 50%). The proportion of respondents who view the impact as negative (33%) has risen very slightly since February 2024 (30%), when it was the lowest negative figure to date.

On the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on ensuring ‘no diminution’ of individual rights as set out in the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, 47% of respondents regard it as positive. This is in line with the previous two polls (46% in February 2024, 49% in October 2023). The proportion of respondents viewing the impact as negative (31%) has edged back up from 27% in February 2024 towards the level of October 2023 (33%).

By February 2023, almost equal proportions of respondents viewed the impact of the Protocol on north-south cooperation as negative and positive. With the Windsor Framework, a significant shift occurred. By February 2024, 53% were positive and 25% negative; the latest poll confirms this gap (53% positive; 29% negative).

Trust to manage the interests of Northern Ireland vis-à-vis the Protocol/Windsor Framework

Implementation of the Protocol involves a range of actors. As with all of our previous polls, the only group that is trusted by a majority to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework are NI business representatives (56%) (see Figure 4). In this latest poll we asked the same question about civic society groups (e.g. trade unions). A narrow majority (51%) trust these groups as well.

 

Figure 4. Levels of trust in/distrust of actors to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

 

Broadly speaking, the picture in this poll is that levels of trust and distrust have returned to those of mid-2023, i.e. post-Windsor Framework and pre-Safeguarding the Union. Trust in the UK Government when it comes to managing the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework, having been at 7% in October 2023, is back down to 3% (as it was in February 2023) and so extremely low. Distrust in the UK Government (85%) has risen back to where it also was immediately pre-Windsor Framework in February 2023. 51% of respondents distrust the UK Government ‘a lot’ – worse than in October 2023 (42%) and only slightly better than in June 2022 (55%).

By contrast, trust in the European Commission/EU to manage the Protocol/Windsor Framework in the interests of Northern Ireland (45%) is slightly lower than in June 2023 (49%). Distrust in the European Commission/EU stands at 43%, so also back to the level in October 2023 (43%) (it had dropped to 40% in February 2024). Trust in the Irish Government (43%) has remained at almost exactly the same level since June 2023 (post Windsor Framework). Distrust in the Irish Government also remains steady at 43%.

Trust in the NI Executive to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework (23%) remains significantly higher than in October 2023 (15%). Distrust of the NI Executive stood at 49% in October 2023 but dropped to 37% in February 2024; it has since moved up slightly to 41%, suggesting a sizeable portion of voters are less enamoured by the new NI Executive four months into its work.

As in the last two polls, this latest poll inquired into levels of trust/distrust in NI civil servants. The level of trust (31%) has dropped markedly since February 2024 (40%) and fallen below the level of October 2023 (35%). The level of distrust (37%) has risen from 30% in February 2024 and back to the same level that it was in October 2023.

As for the main political parties in Northern Ireland, the level of trust in the Alliance Party (43%) remains essentially unchanged since October 2023, having peaked at 50% in June 2022. Trust in the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has fallen from 46% in February 2024 to 40%. There has been a notable drop in trust in the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Having risen to 37% in February 2024, trust in the party is now down to 29% - lower than in October 2023 (32%). Correspondingly, levels of distrust in the UUP have risen to 40% from 35% in February 2024. Nevertheless, the UUP remains the least distrusted political party, a position it now shares with the SDLP. The proportion who trust Sinn Féin (38%) or distrust them (48%) has changed little since June 2023.

Distrust in the DUP to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework has risen to 73% (from 67% in the previous poll), while distrust in Sinn Féin remains unchanged at 48%. Trust in the DUP is now 15%, having fallen in the polls for a second time since October 2023 (27%) and February 2024 (21%). Respondents were also asked to consider the extent to which they trust the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) to manage Northern Ireland’s interests on the Protocol/Windsor Framework. Distrust in the TUV, having remained the same in June 2023 and October 2023 (64%), increased to 71% in February 2024 but has fallen back slightly to 67%. Trust in the TUV, having fallen to 20% in our previous poll, is now 26% and almost back to the level it was in October 2023 (27%).

Where the real shifts have come, therefore, continues to be within unionism. Since the Safeguarding the Union deal was announced and the subsequent return to Stormont, levels of distrust in both of the strongly unionist parties have risen and levels of trust in them has fallen. It is notable, though, that more respondents trust the TUV than trust the DUP and fewer respondents distrust the TUV than distrust the DUP. There was little difference in February between levels of trust in the two parties, either from the ‘strong unionists’ (about a half trusted both) or the ‘slight unionists’ (about a quarter of whom trusted both). In this June 2024 poll, however, two thirds of ‘strong unionists’ (67%) now trust the TUV compared to a little over a third (36%) trusting the DUP. ‘Slight unionists’ have not become more trusting in the TUV but fewer of them (16%) trust the DUP.

Democratic consent and MLAs

The future of core provisions of the Protocol/Windsor Framework – those relating to the movement of goods and the single electricity market (i.e. Articles 5-10) – is subject to the democratic consent of MLAs in a vote that is to be held up to every four years. MLAs will first vote in November/December 2024.

Most respondents (89%) have a view on how they wish their MLAs to vote. A majority (57%) are in favour of the continued application of Articles 5-10 (see Figure 5). This is in line with the three previous polls. Almost a third of respondents (32%) are against continued application. The gap between those for and against the continued application of Articles 5-10 stands at 25% and so still more than double what the gap was before the Windsor Framework was agreed.

Figure 5. Democratic Consent: Based on what you currently know, and are experiencing now, how would you like the MLAs for whom you vote[d] in the 2022 NI Assembly election to vote in 2024 on the Protocol[/Windsor Framework? (All polls)

As in most previous polls we asked how a candidate’s position on the Protocol//Windsor Framework might affect a respondent’s willingness to vote for them. If there were an election to the Northern Ireland Assembly in the next six months, the position of a candidate would be a factor for more than three-quarters of respondents (79%) (see Figure 6). While the figure is high, it is lower than in October 2023 (84%). 29% of respondents would only vote for MLAs who would take an oppositional stance on the Windsor Framework, either by voting against Articles 5-10 (12%) or wanting to see it scrapped altogether (17%). There has not been significant movement on those figures since February 2024 (27% combined) and they remain lower than in October 2023 (32%).

 

Figure 6. Democratic Consent and an NI Assembly Election: If an election to the NI Assembly were held in the next nine months, how important do you think a candidate’s position on the Protocol would be for your vote? (%)

 

In terms of support for the Protocol/Windsor Framework, 35% of voters would definitely vote for candidates in favour of its continued application. This is the same as in the last poll and remains down on the figure of 43% in June 2023 and in line with pre-Windsor Framework figure of 36% in February 2023. As has been the case since the Windsor Framework was agreed, the proportion of respondents who would vote for candidates in favour of the continued application of Articles 5-10 would, however, rise to half (50%) if there is evidence that the Protocol/Windsor Framework is benefitting Northern Ireland.

In light of the forthcoming general election in the UK, a third question on voting intention was asked in order to see the importance of the Protocol/Windsor Framework in that context. Respondents are almost equally split. A third (33%) will only vote for candidates who are supportive of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; just under a third (30%) for candidates who are critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; and for slightly more than a third (37%) a candidate’s position on the Protocol/Windsor Framework will not determine whether they would vote for them or not. The differences between these two questions are interesting and possibly reflect respondents seeing the role of MLAs (i.e. Stormont) as being more important than that of MPs (i.e. Westminster) vis-à-vis the Protocol/Windsor Framework.

Respondents identifying as ‘strongly unionist’ have the clearest position regarding the general election: 77% will only vote for candidates critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. For the majority of ‘slight unionists’ (58%), a candidate’s position on the Protocol/Windsor Framework will be immaterial for their vote. The remaining 42% of ‘slight unionists’ are evenly split (21% and 21%) on whether they will vote for a candidate supportive or critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. Majorities of respondents identifying as ‘slightly nationalist’ (60%) and ‘strongly nationalist’ (55%) will only vote for candidates supportive of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; for the remaining nationalists, a candidate’s position on the Protocol/Windsor Framework will not determine their vote. Among ‘neutral’ respondents, most will either not see the Protocol/Windsor Framework as decisive for their vote (48%) or only vote for a candidate supportive of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (43%).

The Protocol/Windsor Framework as a matter of Concern

The increase in the proportion of respondents for whom the Protocol/Windsor Framework will not be important for determining for whom they vote if a NI Assembly election were held this year corresponds to the relatively low priority given to the effects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework as a matter of concern for most voters (see Figure 7). When placed alongside nine other issues, one fifth of respondents (21%) rank it in their top three issues of concern. For most respondents, however, concerns around health and social care provision, the economy and cost of living, public service delivery ranked higher. Over half of respondents (53%) placed the effects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework among their bottom three issues of concern alongside community relations and immigration. The figures remain almost unchanged compared to February 2024 when they were 20% and 54%, respectively.

Figure 7. Relative ranking of the Windsor Framework as top three or bottom three in a list of ten policy/political issues (%)

 

The Windsor Framework

The next section of the poll focused on some specific aspects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework and its implications. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with certain statements. A first set concern the management of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Views relating to the management of the Windsor Framework (%)

 

On whether the UK government is delivering on its Protocol/Windsor Framework obligation to ensure no diminution of individual rights under the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, only 25% of respondents agreed. This is lower than in February 2024 (28%) and so a further fall since October 2023 (36%). The proportion of those disagreeing (44%) is noticeably higher than in February 2024 (36%) and indeed higher then in October 2023 (40%). There continues to be a shift away from respondents identifying as ‘slightly/strongly nationalist’ and ‘slightly unionist’ thinking that the UK Government is delivering on its obligation. Those who are ‘strongly unionist’ remain the most sceptical, though, with 60% saying the government is not delivering on its obligations (up from 56% in February 2024). This suggests that this question continues to be primarily understood not in terms of Article 2 debates or legal proceedings. The comments made in the open section at the end of the survey indicate that unionists tend to interpret this as UK Government respecting the rights of unionists.

“The emphasis with the protocol has been to appease nationalist and republicans. However, Unionist rights and expectations have been ignored as the border in the sea and being treated differently than the rest of the UK has weakened NI position within the Union.” (91)

“We had a Democratic majority vote to leave the EU and the United Kingdom. GB Should up hold this Basic Human Rights for all their citizens. All we asked for is to be treated equally to all citizens in England Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland. Please ratify this Great Wrong.” (133)

On the issue of ‘Not for EU’ labelling appearing in shops – a requirement for GB-produced meat and dairy products entering Northern Ireland through the ‘UK Internal Market System’ – generally voters (49%), as in February 2024 (50%) and October 2023 (51%), are not ‘bothered’ by the development. The ‘Not for EU’ labelling does though bother a slightly larger proportion of voters (29%) than in previous polls (24% in February 2024; 25% in October 2023). There were three comments made on the labelling issue:

“The labelling of products “not for EU’ helps me to see that these products might be of a lower standard and I don’t buy them.” (252)

“Not for EU labelling bothers me as it is a continual reminder we are no longer in the European Union, to our detriment.” (258)

“Not for EU labelling makes me think I am buying a sub par product.” (298)

In previous polls we have asked about stakeholder engagement. In February 2024, for example, 84% of respondents agreed that it is important that business and civic groups in Northern Ireland have their voices heard over the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. In this latest poll, we sought views on business representatives and on civic society groups separately. Two thirds of respondents (66%) think it important that the voices of civic society groups are heard; and even larger majority (86%) think that it is important that the voices of business representatives are heard.

A fifth statement concerned whether the Safeguarding the Union deal had been oversold. The majority of respondents (57%) agreed that it had been; half of them being strongly of the view. Only 16% disagreed. Of those respondents identifying as ‘unionist’, 80% view the Safeguarding the Union deal as having been oversold. As noted, at the very time this poll was live, the DUP leader Gavin Robinson himself ‘accepted that the party oversold the Stormont deal’. This surely helps explain some of the decline in support for the Windsor Framework in this poll compared to the one in February, in the immediate wake of the Safeguarding the Union deal.

Within a second set of statements, two concerned aspects of the governance of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (see Figure 9). The first was whether, with the North-South Ministerial Council now restored, it should be a forum to discuss how the effects of Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework should be managed on the island of Ireland. Two-thirds of respondents (66%) agreed that it should be. Notably this includes a clear majority across all political communities with the exception of ‘strong unionists’ (52% of whom disagree).

Respondents were more divided on whether MLAs should attempt to use their powers to block changes to EU legislation applicable in Northern Ireland and regardless of the consequences. Such powers exist in the Stormont Brake for amendments and replacements to EU applying in Northern Ireland and in the requirement for cross-community consent for ‘applicability motions’ for new EU laws to be applied under the Protocol/Windsor Framework. Just short of a majority (49%) responded that MLAs should not use their powers regardless of the consequences. More than a third (36%), however, thought that they should. This includes 77% of those who identify as ‘strongly unionist’. Those who are ‘slightly unionist’ are split on the matter, with 38% saying MLAs should use those powers regardless and 35% saying they should not.

Figure 9. Views relating to the governance and context of the Windsor Framework (%)

 

A third statement concerned whether the UK and EU should pursue closer relations under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement to reduce further the need for formalities, checks and controls on the movement of goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and the EU market. The overwhelming view (75%) was that they should. This includes 62% of respondents identifying as ‘strongly unionists’, 87% of ‘slight nationalists’, 88% of ‘neithers’, and 66% of respondents who voted ‘Leave’ in the 2016 referendum. Only 10% of respondents disagreed with the proposition. Wide ranging views on this matter are reflected in the comments section:

“When the U.K. rejoins the SM CU and EU under a Labour gov - all will the Brexit/Protocol debacle will become redundant!!” (213)

“If Labour get in government. We are well screwed. Closer ties to EU means bringing back Single market and customs union overturning a democratic vote without going to the country on it. Sunak definitely oversold the WF infact he and Donaldson lied about what the outcome was. Re immigration we have seen what's happened in Europe England and Ireland....... No thank you for Northern Ireland.” (177)

Also addressing the future of UK-EU relations was a fourth statement on whether pragmatism rather than principle should determine whether the UK should follow EU rules as part of a closer relationship. The majority of respondents (58%) agreed that pragmatism should matter rather than principle. Just over one in five respondents (21%) disagreed. Unionist voters were evenly split: 29% agreeing; 29% disagreeing. Clear majorities of nationalist (69%) and ‘neutral’ (79%) voters agreed.

The final statement concern expectations around the outcome of the General Election; more specifically whether respondents expect the outcome will produce a UK government more likely to engage with the EU to the benefit of Northern Ireland. The majority view (58%) is that it will. One in five respondents (20%) disagreed.

Written comments

We allow space at the end of the poll for people to leave any comments that they wish. While a few people take the chance to comment on the questions and design of the poll, most of the 321 comments express opinions on the topic of Brexit/Windsor Framework, or related matters. They are a rich resource for giving more colour to some of the trends that are reflected in the quantitative data. Because the comments are not from the weighted sample, we cannot describe them as representative, but they do give an indication of some of the sentiments and opinions behind the figures. All the comments quoted here are verbatim.

On the one hand, there are – as with all previous polls – comments expressing negative views about Brexit itself. Brexit is described as ‘a disaster’, ‘a mistake’, and an ‘oversold’ lie with negative effects on Northern Ireland's economy, services, and society and on the UK as a whole.

“Brexit was a big mistake and was the biggest mistake Unionism ever made.” (121)

“Brexit was a colossal act of self-harm, both for NI and the UK.” (173)

A number of comments call for Brexit to be undone by rejoining the EU or (more often) through Irish unification.

“Brexit was a mistake and consequence of Conservative hubris, OTT nationalism and overselling to an ignorant British public. Since we are stuck with it the protocol and Irish Sea Border are the best ways to deal with Brexit and paradoxically + hopefully lead to a United Ireland in the future.” (53)

“The UK government doesn't care about us in the North of Ireland at all so let's just have a United Ireland already.” (167)

There continue to be opinions expressed as to whether the border should be between Northern Ireland and the Republic or the Irish Sea. A number call for the border to be ‘where it should be’ – and in some cases they mean the land border and for others they mean the Irish Sea.

There are many criticisms of the political handling of Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework, accusing leaders of scaremongering, incompetence, and neglecting more critical societal issues.

“As always the practical outworking of UK/EU relations since Brexit has been tortured. It is not at all easy to "right the wrong" in a situation that was clearly a non democratic action perpatrated on the majority of people in NI, and NI will continue to feel the effects of the Brexit scam for many years to come.” (182)

“We were sold a pup! First by Bojo, then Rishi/Ursula and finally Donaldson. Bottom line is that we do not have full access to the U.K. market anymore, product choice is limited, …and there is a strong potential for illegal immigrants to come to Northern Ireland. None of this benefits the people of N Ireland and to present it otherwise is simplistic and misleading but being lied to by all sides and flavours is what citizens here are used to time and time again.” (16)

There is an overwhelming tone of anger towards politicians and a sense of distrust and betrayal. Such criticisms are focused almost entirely on the Irish Government (and by extension the EU), the UK Government and the DUP. Anger towards the Irish government centres on a sense of hypocrisy about their willingness to see checks near the Irish border for immigration purposes, and conniving behind the rationale for the Protocol in the first place:

“By virtue of the fact that the Gardi are checking vechicles without issue make a mockery of those who said there would be trouble if there was a land border. Therefore there is in reality no need for the NI protocol, the Irish sea border or to protect the ROI from British goods entering an EU country.” (97)

“EU/ROI should have been called out for their comments on a 'hard border'. As has been shown recently by the ROI government calling for a border when it comes to immigration a border is needed for certain circumstances between NI and ROI.” (69) “The ROI have enough problems of their own to sort out without sticking their noses in or country. Whenever COVID was about they didn't give a flying f__k about us.” (91)

“No logic behind trade restrictions with GB and worlds 5th largest economy while goods can cross the Irish border unchecked…Unfortunately, Leo Varadker’s threats of bombs at the border and Nationalist politicians threats of civil disobedience at a minimum and rigorous implementation have prevented this and divided NI again.” (92)

The anger towards UK Government comes from both pro-Remain and pro-Leave positions:

“I just feel that brexit has been a total disaster and can't understand how people listened to so many lies, liars and an idiot of a prime minister” (65)

“All issues come from the UK governments failure to implement Brexit properly for the whole of the UK.” (69)

And anger towards DUP also comes from across different political communities and positions on Brexit:

“Everything seems to be about managing unionist rancor towards the WF. The DUP created this mess, and we've all been sucked into the fallout of their best laid plans. NI is a diverse society so unionism needs to realise that they do not take precedence in managing the repercussions of brexit. We have been given a golden opportunity to capitalise on dual market access and all we talk about is unionist rancor.” (71)

“DUP went back into Stormont for ten pieces of silver not thirty, as the underfunding and pay issues are still there DUP needs taught a lesson by Loyalists even if it means losing pro Union MP’s.” (157)

“Their approach does more to damage the union with the UK and ensure the success of a border poll for a United Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement.” (304)

Just as there are strong criticisms of Brexit, so there are strong criticisms of the efforts to address its effects with the Windsor Framework. The Windsor Framework is opposed for various reasons, from being a violation of democratic consent and source of unequal treatment of British citizens in Northern Ireland, to damaging to trade and businesses, and to being ‘a step towards a United Ireland’.

“The Windsor protocol is a fraud imposed upon the people of Northern Ireland. To punish UK voters for Brexit. And Appease those with influence in opposing the Brexit vote, and it's outworkings.” (56)

“I am a DUP voter on moral rather than constitutional or economic grounds. I believe the whole UK (including NI) should have been subject to Brexit in order to break free of the EU. The whole NI Protocol idea should have been a non starter.” (248)

“The Windsor agreement does let sub quality goods into NI from Britain as well cause a migrant crisis for our island.” (70)

“Northern Ireland must be restored as an integral part of the United Kingdom. The protocol must be scrapped.” (232)

Positive views on the Windsor Framework are rather less impassioned. It is seen by those who support it as a mitigation ‘against the worst aspects of Brexit’ and necessary for economic stability:

“The WF is the best deal we could expect in the circs we found ourselves” (159)

Others see potential for economic growth; and some believe NI could benefit from the current arrangements if properly managed.

“Northern Ireland has a unique opportunity to prosper under the Windsor Agreement, with touch points in both the EU and UK. If extremist politicians were able to prioritise pragmatism and economic well-being over valueless ideology, Northern Ireland could attract significant inward investment.” (119)

“The only way we can truly put the past behind us is through economic growth and prosperity. We have an opportunity to become the most desirable region in the UK and Europe to do business. I’m afraid that our politicians are failing to grasp this.” (27)

The debate about the Windsor Framework centres on three main themes. The first is around its implementation. Concerns are expressed over its practical implementation and the impact on trade and businesses. The only detailed comment received on that point in this poll was this one:

“I’ve to plant passport every plant that I sell. I’ve extra wages for staff to do this absurd extra that eats into my profits. I’ve 5-7 days wait on my plants I order due to red tape bringing quality issues now to the forefront. Before this so called protocol I ordered and had my plants 2-3 days. …So those who implemented this fiasco haven’t a clue and real businesses like mine suffer.” (320)

Another aspect of the debate is the concern about ‘democratic deficit’ and Northern Ireland’s voice:

“The protocol is a UK/EU deal and no political party in NI has any meaningful leverage concerning its operations. Aspects of unionism think the protocol is a lurch towards reunification and they are probably right. But anti protocol unionism is partly responsible.” (253)

“The Protocol is a flagrant violation of the basic principle of democratic consent. The Windsor Brake does nothing to address the democratic deficit. No other country would allow its citizens to be governed by laws imposed by a foreign political body...” (32)

Some of those comments relate to a concern that Northern Ireland has not had a ‘proper Brexit’ – a theme that connects to the other core element of the debate about the Windsor Framework, namely the differential treatment of Northern Ireland. Brexit gave rise to particular challenges for Northern Ireland and the means found to address some of those is also specific to it, which brings particular concerns for some unionists:

“The EU under its own rules, should not have any interference within a sovereign country's governance. The Windsor and DUP deals have not protected the position of NI within the Union … I am British, and want the exact same conditions as those living in the rest of the UK.” (25)

“In my opinion the windsor framework shreds the Belfast Agreement and the promises made to the Unionist community.” (118)

“[The WF] is the 1st step in establishing a United Ireland against the will if unionist people” (139)

Looking ahead, there is not a great sense of optimism towards the future. There are different views about what might happen after the general election. Change of government:

“When the U.K. rejoins the SM CU and EU under a Labour gov - all will the Brexit/Protocol debacle will become redundant!! ” (213)

“If Labour get in government. We are well screwed. Closer ties to EU means bringing back Single market and customs union overturning a democratic vote without going to the country on it. Sunak definitely oversold the WF infact he and Donaldson lied about what the outcome was. Re immigration we have seen what's happened in Europe England and Ireland....... No thank you for Northern Ireland.” (177)

“I await a sane UK Government after the election” (90)

“Society can not exist on lies, and it's time those who are telling the lies were removed from the table, it may not happen at this election, but it will be a start to the process of removing the main instigators of the lies, those who blindly followed will be next.” (194)

Last but not least, some respondents are simply looking for a change of story if not government. Many commenters express frustration and exhaustion with the constant focus on Brexit and the Protocol in Northern Ireland, feeling that these issues are over-discussed and detract from more pressing concerns:

“I am fed up with all the discussion on this subject. The WF was approved in the UK parliament by an overwhelming majority and passed into law. Enough energy has been expanded on the subject. MOVE ON.” (103)

“I have zero interest in Brexit & WINDSOR FRAME WORK i JUST WANT TO SEE N. IRELAND HAVE GOOD QUALITY HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE SERVICES. BORED WITH DEBATE ON BREXIT & WINDSOR AGREEMENT & POLITICIANS.” (170)

We will give the final word here to a respondent who was also of this view, and expressed it in a rather long comment that was one that was clearly trying to be as measured as possible:

“I consider myself to be fairly well informed politically with no preference for the broader green and orange politics, however I don't really know what the protocol means or effects. I imagine that it impacts some people a lot and others not at all or not in any significant way. I feel that it is currently being used as a divisive tool by some political representatives.

The majority of people here voted to remain in the EU but we may as well not have voted for all our votes were worth. As always we have had to follow what happens in the rest of the UK. This is annoying but has allowed us the potential to have a special status with our unique nationality situation.

We should now move forward with a solution focused approach and stop deliberating over things that the vast majority do not understand or care about.” (163)

 

* * *

 

This report is available to download here: