What do voters in Northern Ireland think about the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland / Windsor Framework?

 

November 2024

David Phinnemore, Katy Hayward, and Lisa Claire Whitten ^{[ 1 ]}

This report is available to download here: 

 

Executive Summary

• The impact that the Safeguarding the Union deal had in tempering negative views of the Protocol/Windsor Framework appears to have already been reversed.
  • 50% of respondents regard the Protocol/Windsor Framework as overall ‘a good thing for Northern Ireland’. This is lower than in the four previous polls in June/October 2023 and February/June 2024.
  • 52% see the Protocol/Windsor Framework as an appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit on Northern Ireland. This is significantly below the 60% in February 2024 and at pre-Windsor Framework levels.
  • The proportion of those who ‘strongly disagree’ that the Windsor Framework is, on balance, ‘a good thing’ has returned to the level it was before Safeguarding the Union (25%).
  • There has been a drop in support for the Windsor Framework from both ‘slightly unionist’ and ‘strongly unionist’ respondents.
  • 36% of respondents disagree that the Protocol/Windsor Framework is overall a ‘good thing’ for Northern Ireland. This is back to the level seen in October 2023 (35%).
  • 34% of respondents disagree that the Protocol/Windsor Framework provides an appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit in Northern Ireland. This is down on 29% in February 2024 and, as in June 2024 (35%), back to the level in October 2023 (35%).
• Views on the political impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework remain less negative than they have been previously; most positive views are on its economic consequences.
  • Voters continue to view the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on political stability in Northern Ireland as being more negative (40%) than positive (36%). The gap has closed since June 2024 (46% negative, 35% positive) and so significantly narrower than in October 2023 (55% negative, 24% positive). The four percentage points difference between negative/positive views is the narrowest it has been in four years of polling.
  • 48% of respondents think the Protocol/Windsor Framework is having a positive impact on the Northern Ireland economy, down from 54% in June 2024; 35% disagree, up from 28% in June 2024.
  • 63% think the Protocol/Windsor Framework offers unique opportunities that could benefit Northern Ireland, down from 68% in June 2024.
  • More voters continue see the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market as negative (41%) rather than positive (32%) – a clear reversal of the situation in February 2024 (41% positive, 34% negative). In October 2023, views were equally split (39%).
  • More voters see the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland’s constitutional place in the UK as negative (45%) than positive (23%). The gap is considerably wider than in February 2024 (37% negative, 30% positive) and October 2023 (43% negative, 29% positive).
  • Respondents are back to being more positive (40%) than negative (35%) about the impact the Protocol/Windsor Framework is currently having on UK-EU relations, although they are less positive than in February 2024, when 42% regarded the impact as positive and 31% as negative
  • Voters are again evenly split on whether the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on British-Irish relations is positive (37%) or negative (36%); in June most viewed the current impact as negative (41%) rather than positive (31%).
• There continue to be mixed levels of trust/distrust in political actors and institutions to manage Northern Ireland’s interests with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • The UK Government is by far the most distrusted (74%) and least trusted (8%) of all actors. That said, the figures are a marked improvement on the figures in June 2024 (85% distrust, 3% trust) and are the warmest seen on this question since our polling began.
  • Voters are almost evenly split on whether they currently trust (41%) or distrust (42%) the European Commission/EU; the gap has considerably narrowed since June 2023 (49% trust, 41% distrust).
  • Northern Ireland business representatives continue to be the actors most trusted (51%) to manage Northern Ireland’s interests with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework, although the proportion has dropped from 56% in June 2024; only 15% of respondents distrust them.
  • A significant proportion of respondents trust (47%) as opposed to distrust (31%) civic society groups (e.g. trade unions) to manage Northern Ireland’s interests with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
• Self-declared understanding of the Protocol/Windsor Framework remains high, with a substantial majority of respondents (65%) claiming ‘a good understanding’.
  • More respondents agree (39%) than disagree (32%) that the Protocol/Windsor Framework arrangements are too complex to be fully understood
  • Under half (41%) of respondents say that reliable information is available on the Windsor Framework (down from 54% in February).
  • Three quarters of respondents (75%) would like to see the UK and EU jointly present more factual information on the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • Few respondents agree (13%) that the NI Assembly is doing a good job in debating Northern Ireland’s interests with regard to the Protocol/Windsor Framework; the majority (58%) disagree.
  • Almost half of respondents disagree (45%) that media coverage of the Protocol/Windsor Framework is sufficient for voters to have an informed understanding of actual effects; just over a quarter (28%) agree.
• The Protocol/Windsor Framework is an important consideration for most respondents when it comes to their voting intentions. However, in comparison to other political/policy issues, it is not a major concern for most.
  • Only a fifth of respondents (21%) say that a candidate’s position on the Protocol/Windsor Framework will not determine whether they will vote for them if there were a Northern Ireland Assembly election in the next six months.
  • Under half of respondents say that a candidate’s position on the Protocol/ Windsor Framework determined in full or in part whether they voted for them in the UK General Election on 4 July 2024. 22% only voted for candidates supportive of the Protocol/ Windsor Framework; 23% only voted for candidates who are critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework.
  • The effects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework rank low among voters’ current concerns, with only 5% of respondents placing it as their top concern in a list of ten and 20% putting it in their top three; 58% put it among their lowest three concerns out of the ten listed.
• On the future of the Protocol/Windsor Framework:
  • Most respondents (57%) again want MLAs to vote in favour of the continued application of Articles 5-10 of the Protocol/Windsor Framework; a third (33%) want MLAs to vote against.
  • The overwhelming majority of respondents (84%) expect the Protocol/Windsor Framework to remain a point of contestation in Northern Ireland politics for the foreseeable future. Only 7% disagree.
  • A clear majority of respondents agree (70%) that public opinion in Northern Ireland on Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework should continue to be measured in polls like these; only 10% disagreed. Those most keen (87%) are of respondents who did not vote in the 2016 referendum.

Introduction

As part of an extended ESRC-funded research project on the implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, a series of regular polls has been commissioned to ‘temperature test’ voter attitudes on a range of issues relating to Brexit and the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, and their implications for Northern Ireland (NI). This is the only polling in Northern Ireland dedicated to the topic of the Protocol (now generally known as the ‘Windsor Framework’) and which has been running at regular intervals since the Protocol entered fully into force on 1 January 2021.

The polls are being conducted every four months during 2021-2024 by LucidTalk using its online Northern Ireland Opinion Panel. LucidTalk have a strong track-record of accurately predicting election and referendum results in Northern Ireland on the basis of polling this Opinion Panel. The results presented here are from a sample of 1020 responses (from a total of 2711 received) to the poll undertaken on 18-21 October 2024. The sample used is weighted to be representative of the adult population of Northern Ireland (e.g. by age, gender, region). All results presented are accurate to a margin of error of +/-2.3% at 95% confidence.

The context for this poll

This twelfth full poll was conducted more than three years after the end of the 11-month transition period that followed the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020. Most of our earlier polls were conducted in a context of ongoing contestation and political tensions around the Protocol and often strained UK-EU relations. The context for more recent polls has been significantly improved UK-EU relations. This followed the adoption of the Windsor Framework in February 2023 which introduced a ‘Stormont Brake’ on amendments and replacements to certain EU laws applicable in Northern Ireland, revised arrangements for the movement of retail goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and for the supply of medicines, together with new implementation milestones.

Since then, the existing joint EU-UK bodies overseeing implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework have been meeting regularly, new bodies have been established, and joint commitments to stakeholder engagement put in place. Some issues concerning the implementation of the Protocol/Windsor Framework still have to be addressed, however (e.g. on the supply of veterinary medicines into Northern Ireland once the current ‘grace period’ expires at the end of 2025). Concerns around the Protocol/Windsor Framework, particularly among unionist voters, have persisted.

Various of these concerns appeared to have been sufficiently addressed in the Safeguarding the Union ‘deal’ that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreed with the UK Government in January 2024 and which led to the DUP supporting the return of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the establishment of a new Northern Ireland Executive. On 3 February 2024, the NI Assembly convened and elected a Speaker and on the same day Michelle O’Neill (Sinn Féin) and Emma Little-Pengelly (DUP) were sworn in as First Minister and deputy First Minister respectively and a new Executive was formed. The return of the NI Assembly also meant the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee could be established and begin its work.

The Safeguarding the Union deal included new commitments regarding Northern Ireland’s position within the UK and actions to deliver on them. These included: new internal UK bodies and structures (e.g. a UK East-West Council); government departments giving ‘special regard to Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market’ when bringing forward regulation; a UK Government commitment to 'no unnecessary checks within the UK internal market’; and a UK Internal Market Guarantee aiming to ensure that at least 80% of GB-NI freight movements go through the ‘UK Internal Market System’ (previously called the ‘green lane’). Legislation has since been adopted implementing most of the commitments.

Of particular significance for MLAs now back at Stormont is legislation providing for the Stormont Brake on amendments and replacements to EU law applicable under the Protocol/Windsor Framework and for ‘applicability motions’ on whether new EU legislation can be added to it. Although no attempt has yet been made to trigger the Stormont Brake, two ‘applicability motion’ debates have been held: the first motion was rejected; the second passed. And the UK Government has also legislated for an earlier independent review of the Protocol/Windsor Framework if there is only a simple (i.e. not cross-community) majority endorsing its continued application in the Assembly’s democratic consent vote towards the end of 2024. The ‘applicability motion’ debates, as anticipated, provided opportunities for supporters, critics, and opponents to rehearse their positions on the Protocol/Windsor Framework.

The most significant political development for the context for this poll was the UK general election on 4 July 2024 that saw Labour securing a 174-seat majority in the House of Commons and forming a new UK government with Keir Starmer as Prime Minister. A key priority is a ‘reset’ in relations with the EU, and to this end Starmer in a joint statement with the President of the European Commission on 2 October underlined the mutual commitment ‘to the full and faithful implementation’ on the Windsor Framework. This followed a slightly more nuanced commitment from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Hilary Benn, stating that the UK Government would be implementing the Windsor Framework ‘with pragmatic good faith’. Given the reset ambition and the desire, among other things, to improve the UK’s trade relationship with the EU ‘by tearing down unnecessary barriers to trade’ and negotiating a veterinary agreement ‘to prevent unnecessary border checks’, such commitments are necessary. The EU is not expected to agree to closer relations unless the UK delivers on existing obligations.

While limited progress has been made towards negotiating a closer UK-EU relationship, the more positive tone to relations and repeated UK Government commitments to implementation of the Windsor Framework did help deliver an agreed six-month delay to the introduction of the new regime for GB-NI parcels movements from 1 October 2024 to 31 March 2025. Focusing minds was also the prospect of the ‘democratic consent process’ being launched and a likely NI Assembly vote on the future of much of the Protocol/Windsor Framework before the end of 2024.

Participants in the poll on 18-21 October 2024 were asked six sets of questions and offered the opportunity to provide written comments in response to the poll. The questions covered attitudes towards Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework, assessments of the latter’s impact, and views on its relative importance compared to other current issues of concern (e.g. the state of the economy, health and social care provision). As in previous polls, participants were asked to indicate how much they trust different actors to manage Northern Ireland’s interests regarding the Protocol/Windsor Framework, and how they would like MLAs to vote in a ‘democratic consent’ vote at the end of 2024. They were also asked how important the Protocol/ Windsor Framework would be for their voting preferences in a future NI Assembly election and were in the UK general election on 4 July. A final section sought views on information/polling about and understanding of the Protocol/Windsor Framework and whether it is likely to remain a point of contestation in Northern Ireland politics for the foreseeable future.

Attitudes to Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework

This latest polling continues to show most voters in Northern Ireland as either generally accepting or supportive of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. However, opinion remains divided, with continued opposition among many unionists to its arrangements. The slight warming to the Protocol under the Windsor Framework (as seen in the June 2023 poll) continues to be reflected in several of the findings of this latest poll, but on some questions levels of support have dropped compared to previous Testing the Temperature polls, and in some instances have returned to pre-Windsor Framework levels. Opposition to the Protocol/Windsor Framework remains firm among around a third of respondents, who predominantly self-identify as ‘strongly unionist’.

Two thirds of respondents (65%) claim a ‘good understanding’ of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (see Figure 1). This is down on previous polls (e.g. 74% in October 2023) and indeed the lowest recorded level across these polls. Also lower – and falling – Is the proportion of respondents (41%) who think that reliable information exists on the Protocol/Windsor Framework. In February 2024, more than half of respondents (54%) thought that reliable information exists; this dropped to 47% in June 2024. The lowest level recorded was 37% in March 2021. The latest drop confirms a resurgent wariness of information on the topic, and it corresponds with the finding in June 2024 that that 57% of respondents believed the Safeguarding the Union deal was oversold.

The clear majority of respondents (70%) continue to agree that ‘particular arrangements’ for Northern Ireland are needed to manage the effects of Brexit. The proportion of all respondents being strongly of this view (46%) has fallen back from 51% in June 2024, the highest recorded to date in our polls.

Figure 1. Opinion of Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

The narrow majority (52%) who agree or strongly agree that the Protocol/Windsor Framework – now with the UK Government’s Safeguarding the Union deal with the DUP – provides an appropriate means for managing the effects of Brexit for Northern Ireland is again markedly below the 60% recorded in February 2024 and more in line with the 53-54% in previous polls (when the question focused on the Protocol with the ‘grace periods’).

Half of respondents (50%) regard the Protocol with the Windsor Framework as ‘on balance, a good thing’ for Northern Ireland, although the figure remains down on the 55-56% figures seen in the June and October 2023 and February 2024 polls (see Figure 2). As in June 2024 (52%) it is at pre-Windsor Framework levels, although still above the lowest recorded level in June 2021 (43%).

Figure 2. The Protocol/Windsor Framework is on balance ‘a good thing’ for Northern Ireland (%)

As in February 2024 most respondents overall ‘agree’ rather than ‘strongly agree’ that the Protocol with the Windsor Framework as ‘on balance, a good thing’ for Northern Ireland. For those disagreeing with the proposition, the overall figure has risen to 36% having dropped to 29% in February 2024. It remains lower than the immediate pre-Windsor Framework figure in February 2023 (41%). The impact of Safeguarding the Union in tempering some opposition to the Protocol/Windsor Framework has clearly been reversed.

On whether Brexit itself is on balance ‘a good thing for the UK’, there continues to be a clear majority (66%) who disagree. This remains higher than in the polls conducted in 2023 (e.g. 60% in October). The majority (56%) strongly of that opinion is the second largest across our polls to date. The proportion of respondents viewing Brexit as on balance ‘a good thing for the UK’ (30%) has recovered from the drop to 26% in June 2024.

Majority acceptance of the Protocol with the Windsor Framework is also reflected in responses to the question on whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework provides Northern Ireland with a ‘unique set of post-Brexit economic opportunities compared to the rest of the UK which, if exploited, could benefit Northern Ireland’. Just under two thirds of respondents (63%) agree that there are economic opportunities to be had from the Protocol/Windsor Framework. The figure is lower than in three of our last four polls (June 2023 and February/June 2024) when it was the highest (68%) it had been since our first poll in March 2021. Just over a quarter of respondents (27%) disagree there are economic opportunities, so within the range of previous polls (23-34%).

Views on the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework

The poll asked respondents for their assessment of the current impact of the Protocol/ Windsor Framework being implemented (see Figure 3). Important to note here is that the phased implementation of the Windsor Framework removes the ‘grace periods’ for the application of some of the Protocol’s provisions and replaces them with new ‘green lane’/Internal Market System arrangements for reducing/removing formalities, checks and controls on the movement of goods into Northern Ireland from Great Britain.

On the question of the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on the economy of Northern Ireland, under half of respondents (48%) currently view it as positive (markedly down on February 2024 – 56%, and lower than in February 2023 – 50%); 35% view the impact as negative (so back above the level in October 2023 – 32%). Respondents are clearly divided along identity lines. The clear majority of ‘strongly unionist’ voters viewing the impact as negative (83%) has risen markedly since June 2024 (65%). The proportion of ‘slightly unionist’ voters viewing the impact as positive (46%) has increased since June 2024 (41%) but remains down on February 2024 (50%). The proportion of nationalist (7%) and ‘neutral’ (14%) voters viewing the impact as negative has increased slightly since June 2024 but remains very low.

When it comes to Northern Ireland’s relationship with the rest of the UK, the impact of the Safeguarding the Union deal noted in February 2024 has clearly evaporated. Whereas in February 2024, for the first time, more voters regarded the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market as positive (41%) than negative (34%), this is no longer the case: currently only 32% regard the impact as positive and 41% see it as negative. The overwhelming majority of ‘strongly unionist’ voters (89%) continue to view the impact as negative (up from 70% in February and 80% in June). The Safeguarding the Union deal saw ‘slightly unionist’ voters move from viewing the impact on Northern Ireland’s place in the UK Internal Market in October 2023 as negative (50%; positive 26%) to the plurality seeing it as positive (44%, to 38% negative) in February. Eight months on, 49% of ‘slightly unionist’ voters see its impact as negative and 35% see its impact as positive. More than four fifths of nationalist and ‘neutral’ voters continue to view the impact as either positive or neutral in this regard.

Figure 3. Overall assessment of the current impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

Views on the impact of the Windsor Framework in political terms have typically been more negative. The proportion of respondents seeing the Protocol’s current impact as negative on Northern Ireland’s constitutional position in the United Kingdom (45%) remains unchanged compared to June 2024 and so markedly higher than in February 2024 (37%).

In polls during 2021-23, a majority of respondents (54-68%) saw the Protocol/Windsor Framework impacting negatively on political stability in Northern Ireland. The figure has since declined and is now at 40%, its lowest across all of our polls. 36% of respondents believe that the Protocol/Windsor Framework is having a positive impact on political stability in Northern Ireland.

The latest polling confirms the more positive views on the Protocol/Windsor Framework’s impact on British-Irish and UK-EU relations that have been present since the Windsor Framework was adopted. In February 2023, a majority of voters viewed the impact of the Protocol as negative (British-Irish relations – 58%; UK-EU relations – 57%). With the Windsor Framework, the figures for negative impact on UK-EU and British-Irish relations went down. In the latest poll, the proportion of respondents viewing the Protocol/Windsor Framework as having a negative impact on UK-EU relations stands at 35%, and 36% view it as negatively affecting British-Irish relations. The proportion of voters perceiving the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on British-Irish relations to be positive (37%) is almost exactly the same as negative. It is noticeably higher than in June 2024 (31%) but still lower than June 2023 (43%). The proportion of voters viewing the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on UK-EU relations as positive (40%) is lower than a year ago (46% in October 2023).

Most respondents continue to view the Protocol/Windsor Framework as having a positive impact on protecting the 1998 Agreement. Currently, 52% are of this view. The proportion of respondents who view the impact as negative (33%) remains above the lowest negative figure to date in February 2024 (30%).

On the impact of the Protocol/Windsor Framework on ensuring ‘no diminution’ of individual rights as set out in the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, 46% of respondents regard it as positive. This is in line with the previous two polls. The proportion of respondents viewing the impact as negative remains at 31%, and so up from 27% in February 2024 and towards the level of October 2023 (33%).

By February 2023, almost equal proportions of respondents viewed the impact of the Protocol on north-south cooperation as negative and as positive. With the Windsor Framework, a significant shift occurred. By February 2024, 53% were positive and 25% negative; the latest poll confirms this gap (52% positive; 28% negative).

Trust to manage the interests of Northern Ireland vis-à-vis the Protocol/Windsor Framework

Implementation of the Protocol involves a range of actors. As with all of our previous polls, the only group that is trusted by a majority to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework are NI business representatives (51%) (see Figure 4). Also more trusted (47%) than distrusted (31%) are civic society groups (e.g. trade unions).

Broadly speaking, the picture in this poll is that levels of trust and distrust have returned to those of mid-2023, i.e. post-Windsor Framework and pre-Safeguarding the Union. Trust in the UK Government when it comes to managing the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework, having dropped to 3% in June 2024 (the same level as in February 2023) has now increased to 8%, its highest level across all polls. Distrust in the UK Government (74%) remains very high but is at its lowest recorded level. 43% of respondents distrust the UK Government ‘a lot’ – as in October 2023 (42%).

Figure 4. Levels of trust in/distrust of actors to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework (%)

By contrast, trust in the European Commission/EU to manage the Protocol/Windsor Framework in the interests of Northern Ireland (41%) has fallen to the same level as in June 2021. In June 2023, almost half of voters (49%) trusted the European Commission/EU. Distrust in the European Commission/EU stands at 42%, consistent with its position since October 2023. Trust in the Irish Government (43%) has remained at almost exactly the same level since June 2023 (i.e. post-Windsor Framework). Distrust in the Irish Government also remains steady at 44%.

Trust in the NI Executive to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework (20%) has fallen again compared to February 2024 (25%) but remains higher than in October 2023 (15%). Distrust of the NI Executive stood at 49% in October 2023 but dropped to 37% in February 2024; it has since moved up to 47%, suggesting a sizeable portion of voters are less enamoured by the new NI Executive eight months into its work.

As in the last three polls, this latest poll inquired into levels of trust/distrust of NI civil servants. The level of trust (30%) has dropped markedly since February 2024 (40%) and fallen below the level of October 2023 (35%). The level of distrust (42%) has risen from 30% in February 2024.

As for the main political parties in Northern Ireland, the level of trust in the Alliance Party (38%) has dropped to its lowest level across all polls. Its highest level was 50% in June 2022. Trust in the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has risen slightly to 42% and so back towards the 46% in February 2024. There has been a notable drop in trust in the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Having risen to 37% in February 2024, trust in the party is now down to 25% – its lowest level to date. Correspondingly, levels of distrust in the UUP have risen to 42% compared to 35% in February 2024. Nevertheless, the UUP remains the least distrusted political party, a position it continues to share with the SDLP. The proportion who trust Sinn Féin has decreased since June 2024 (38%) to 33%, while distrust in Sinn Féin has seen a corresponding rise to 53% (up from 48%).

Distrust in the DUP to manage the interests of Northern Ireland with respect to the Protocol/Windsor Framework has risen to 77% (from 73% in June 2024 and 67% in the February 2024). Trust in the DUP remains at 15%, having fallen in previous polls from 27% in October 2023. Respondents were also asked to consider the extent to which they trust the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) to manage Northern Ireland’s interests on the Protocol/Windsor Framework. Distrust in the TUV, having remained the same in June 2023 and October 2023 (64%), increased to 71% in February 2024 but has once again fallen back and now stands at 65%. Trust in the TUV, having fallen to 20% in February 2024, is now at 28% so in line with the previous highest level in October 2023 (27%).

Where the real shifts have come, therefore, continues to be within unionism. Since the Safeguarding the Union deal was announced and the subsequent return to Stormont, levels of distrust in both of the strongly unionist parties have risen and levels of trust in all three unionist parties regarding the Windsor Framework/Protocol has fallen. It is notable, though, that more respondents trust the TUV than trust the DUP and fewer respondents distrust the TUV than distrust the DUP. There was little difference in February 2024 between levels of trust in the two parties, either from the ‘strong unionists’ (about a half trusted both) or the ‘slight unionists’ (about a quarter of whom trusted both). In this October 2024 poll, however, three quarters of ‘strong unionists’ (77%) now trust the TUV compared to a little over a third (35%) trusting the DUP. ‘Slight unionists’ have not become more trusting in the TUV (25% in June and October 2024) but fewer of them (19%) trust the DUP.

Democratic consent and MLAs

The future of core provisions of the Protocol/Windsor Framework – those relating to the movement of goods and the single electricity market (i.e. Articles 5-10) – is subject to the democratic consent of MLAs in a vote that is to be held potentially every four years. MLAs are expected to hold a first vote in November/December 2024.

Most respondents (90%) have a view on how they wish their MLAs to vote. A majority (57%) are in favour of the continued application of Articles 5-10 (see Figure 5). This is in line with the three previous polls. A third of respondents (33%) are against ‘democratic consent’ for continued application. The gap between those for and against the continued application of Articles 5-10 stands at 24 percentage points and so still more than double what the gap was before the Windsor Framework was agreed. Support for ‘democratic consent’ is highest among those respondents who identify as ‘strongly nationalist’ (92%), ‘slightly nationalist’ (87%) or ‘neutral’ (84%). Opposition to ‘democratic consent’ among respondents who identify as ‘strongly unionist’ (90%). Respondents who identify as ‘slightly unionist’ are more likely to favour MLAs supporting (44%) than opposing (27%) the continued application of Articles 5-10.

Figure 5. Democratic Consent: Based on what you currently know, and are experiencing now, how would you like the MLAs for whom you vote[d] in the 2022 NI Assembly election to vote in 2024 on the Protocol/Windsor Framework? (All polls)

As in most previous polls we asked how a candidate’s position on the Protocol//Windsor Framework might affect a respondent’s willingness to vote for them if there were an election to the Northern Ireland Assembly in the next six months, the position of a candidate would be a factor for more than three-quarters of respondents (79%) (see Figure 6). While the figure is high, it is lower than in October 2023 (84%). 31% of respondents would only vote for MLAs who would take an oppositional stance on the Windsor Framework, either by voting against Articles 5-10 (12%) or wanting to see it scrapped altogether (19%). There has been a steady increase in those figures since February 2024 (27% combined) (i.e. since the Safeguarding the Union deal) towards what they were in October 2023 (32% combined).

Figure 6. Democratic Consent and an NI Assembly Election: If an election to the NI Assembly were held in the next nine months, how important do you think a candidate’s position on the Protocol would be for your vote? (%)

In terms of support for the Protocol/Windsor Framework, 34% of voters would definitely vote for candidates in favour of its continued application. This is less than the figure of 43% in June 2023 and indeed below the pre-Windsor Framework figure of 36% in February 2023. In polls conducted since the Windsor Framework was agreed, the proportion of respondents who would vote for candidates in favour of the continued application of Articles 5-10 has risen to 50% or more if there is evidence that the Protocol/Windsor Framework is benefitting Northern Ireland. That is no longer the case.

A third question asked concerned the importance of the Protocol/Windsor Framework for respondents’ votes in the recent UK general election. For most respondents, either a candidate’s position did not determine whether they voted for them (29%), or they were aware of the candidate’s position, but this had ‘nothing to do’ with why they voted for them (23%). Of those respondents who voted for candidates in part or otherwise because of their position on the Protocol/Windsor Framework, 23% voted for candidates critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework and 22% for candidates supportive. A candidate’s position on the Protocol/Windsor Framework was most important for respondents identifying as ‘strongly unionist’, for 64% of whom a candidate being critical of the Protocol/Windsor Framework mattered for their vote.

The Protocol/Windsor Framework as a matter of Concern

The increase in the proportion of respondents for whom the Protocol/Windsor Framework will not be important for determining for whom they vote if a NI Assembly election were held this year corresponds to the relatively low priority given to the effects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework as a matter of concern for most voters (see Figure 7). When placed alongside nine other issues, one fifth of respondents (20%) rank it in their top three issues of concern. This is in line with the previous polls in 2024.

Figure 7. Relative Ranking of the Effects of the Windsor Framework as Top Three or Bottom Three in a List of Ten Policy/Political Issues (%)

For most respondents, however, concerns around health and social care provision, the economy and cost of living, public service delivery ranked higher. Over half of respondents (58%) placed the effects of the Protocol/Windsor Framework among their bottom three issues of concern alongside community relations and immigration. This is higher than in February and June 2024 (53-4%).

The Windsor Framework

The final section of the poll focused on information/polling about and understanding of the Protocol/Windsor Framework and whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework is likely to remain a point of contestation in Northern Ireland politics for the foreseeable future (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Views relating to the management of the Windsor Framework (%)

On whether the Protocol/Windsor Framework arrangements are too complex to be fully understood, more respondents agree (39%) than disagree (32%). Three quarters of respondents (75%) would like to see the UK and EU jointly present more factual information on the Protocol/Windsor Framework; only 7% disagree. And few (13%) agree that the NI Assembly is doing a good job in debating Northern Ireland’s interests with regard to the Protocol/Windsor Framework; the majority (58%) disagree. Respondents identifying as nationalist are less critical of the NI Assembly in this respect than respondents identifying as unionist.

As for whether media coverage of the Protocol/Windsor Framework is sufficient for voters to have an informed understanding of actual effects more respondents disagree (45%) than agree (28%). Respondents identifying as nationalist are less uncomfortable with the coverage than those respondents identifying as unionist.

As this is the final scheduled poll of our Post-Brexit Governance NI, participants were asked whether completing polls on the Protocol/Windsor Framework had added to their understanding of it and encouraged them to find out more. On both questions more than twice as many respondents agreed (41% and 43% respectively) than disagreed (17% and 19% respectively). As to whether public opinion in Northern Ireland on Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework should continue to be measured in polls like these, a clear majority (70%) agreed; only 10% disagreed. Those most keen on such polls continuing were the 87% of respondents who had not voted in the 2016 referendum on whether the UK should remain in or leave the EU.

The final question on which the view of poll participants was sought was whether they expected the Protocol/Windsor Framework will remain a point of contestation in Northern Ireland politics for the foreseeable future. The overwhelming majority (84%) agree that it will; only 7% disagree.

Written comments

We allow space at the end of the poll for respondents to leave any comments that they wish. While some respondents take the chance to comment on the questions and design of the poll, most of the 351 comments express opinions on the topic of Brexit/Protocol/Windsor Framework, or related matters. They are a rich resource for giving more colour to some of the trends that are reflected in the quantitative data. Because the comments are not from the weighted sample, we cannot describe them as representative, but they do give an indication of some of the sentiments and opinions behind the figures. All the comments quoted here are verbatim.

On the one hand, there are – as with all previous polls – comments expressing negative views about Brexit itself. Brexit is described as ‘a disaster’, ‘a mistake’, and based on ‘poor information’ with negative effects on Northern Ireland and thee wider UK.

“Brexit has been a disaster for the UK and NI in particular. The Protocol was the poor result of poor planning by UKG and dishonesty on its part. Something like it is regrettably necessary under the Brexit settlement.”(41)

“Brexit was the biggest mistake of this generation and will negatively impact all subsequent generations.” (2)

“Brexit… not wanted in NI, a disastrous decision for the UK.” (146)

“Brexit was a big mistake, both for Northern Ireland and for the wider UK.” (152)

“Brexit was always going to affect us badly. A terrible mistake that caused the past to reappear here.” (158)

There continue to be opinions expressed as to whether the border should be between Northern Ireland and the Republic or the Irish Sea. A number call for the border to be ‘where it should be’.

“We have a border down the Irish Sea, causing problems with companies sending/selling/posting things here. The border should be on land between Northern Ireland and Ireland, where the actual border us.” (180)

“Should have proper Brexit in NI along with GB. No need for fudge, border checks should apply to actual border, could have been done away from border.” (229)

“Put the border on the border where it should have been placed at the start.” (271)

Other respondents are more interested in their being a border poll.

“United Ireland border poll planning now.” (96)

“Until there is unification the Protocol will continue to be used as a negative thing by extreme unionists who are clinging to anything to stay in power.” (151)

“A border poll will provide the answers.” (103)

There are many criticisms of the political handling of Brexit and the Protocol/Windsor Framework, with politicians being accused of incompetence.

“Brexit was a poor decision based on poor information from our politicians. Trust in the political system will take a long time to recover from mistakes made and false information provided by those in leadership positions.” (80)

“Brexit was, and remains, a thoroughly stupid and harmful decision brought about by a deluded electorate, misinformed by an atavistic and malevolent media, and championed by selfish and incompetent politicians, especially in NI. (226)

“Brexit was and is a waste of time. An excuse for some politicians to grandstand and like the sound of their own voice.” (286)

Compared to comments in previous polls, there are fewer criticisms of the Irish government (and by implication the EU). Comments on past UK Governments tend to be critical; those concerning the new Labour Government express optimism it may improve relations with the EU.

“The border was brought into play when it suited the Irish government to move illegal immigrants, so why can it not be in play for goods like any other nation” (106)

“The protocol/WF is a Trojan Horse, designed by the ROI to pave the road for economic unity in advance of their fantasy UI project. The British government was weak in its negotiation and failed to implement Brexit in Northern Ireland.” (173)

“The Government have not delivered the Brexit I voted for, there should be no divergence from the rest of the United Kingdom.” (270)

“I am hopeful that the Labour government will foster closer ties with Europe and that the Windsor framework will become much less significant.” (111)

“Brexit seems to be a done deal and we are killing dead things continuing to debate it. Hopefully the new government can reset the relationship with the EU and Ireland.” (135)

As for comments on political parties, the largest number concern the DUP, but it is significantly less mentioned than in previous polls and the comments are generally not as hostile. Comments on political parties otherwise tend to express respondents’ voting preferences.

“Profile/framework must go! Sea border must be dismantled immediately! Northern Ireland place in UK must be fully restored! DUP sold out with their Dud Donaldson Deal which changed not a word of substance nor removed 1 syllable of EU Law!” (243)

Just as there are strong criticisms of Brexit, so there are strong criticisms of the Protocol/Windsor Framework. The Protocol/Windsor Framework is opposed for various reasons, from its perceived/actual impact on Northern Ireland’s position in the UK and the continued application EU law in Northern Ireland to its implications for trade and businesses and the availability of goods.

“Northern Ireland should have Brexit the same as the rest of the UK. I think the Protocol goes against rights guaranteed to Unionists in the Belfast Agreement.” (94)

“The Protocol/Windsor Framework needs removed and Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom restored completely.” (167)

“We are still shackled to the EU with no say in the rules they are imposing on NI and annexed from mainland UK.” (244)

“As part of the UK we should not still be under the rule of the EU. No real benefit just a lot more red tape.” (348)

“The Protocol/Windsor Framework has given businesses in GB who reluctantly supplied goods to NI an excuse not to continue. You can directly see the effects of this in looking at what’s available on supermarket shelves or doing online shopping.” (30)

“The Protocol is a farce. NI people cannot order a considerable amount of items on the internet as the suppliers will not post to NI. I have even ordered stuff got it sent to family in GB and they then posted the items over.” (101)

Positive views on the Protocol/Windsor Framework are less impassioned. It is seen by those who support it as an arrangement that either does or could benefit Northern Ireland:

“I think that the Protocol is a necessary evil because of Brexit. It will never go away completely but hopefully it will be a benefit for NI.” (20)

“The Windsor Framework offers NI a unique opportunity to attract inward investment and thence to thrive economically. Better economic conditions, job security and an increased standard of living would serve to temper some views on the de-partitioning of Ireland.” (38)

“In general the Protocol / Windsor Framework is a good thing for NI. However, we wouldn’t need either if we had remained in the EU.” (119)

“I think it is important it stays in place however I don’t believe enough is being done to fully maximise the benefits of being in both markets.” (282)

“Protocol ....at least it's trying to make a silk purse out of the pig's ear [o]f Brexit” (121)

Comments about the Protocol/Windsor Framework also reflect concerns around its politicization and the extent to which it is actually understood and discussions are informed or misinformed.

“The constitutional issue once more provides an unwelcome distraction from more pressing issues like housing, health, education, and infrastructure. The Protocol and its impact so far is negligible and is exploited by both sides of the community divide for their own ends.” (197)

“Some people with alterior [sic] motives have been using the Protocol to cause division, therefore it’s important for our politicians and business leaders to challenge those narratives, regularly and strongly.” (269)

“The Executive and other institutions need to focus on what actually matters – getting the right amount of money from the UK [government] to fund public services and get on with their work. This topic just leads to a toxic conversation and distracts from the real issues.” (311)

“There should definitely be more factual publicity on the Protocol starting now.” (48)

“There is a lot of coverage of the Protocol but not all of it is consistent, honest, or true.” (59)

“Not enough is being done by our broadcasting services, our MLAs and the UK government to counter false information being put out by anti-Protocol persons.” (67)

“I don’t think the general public have a particularly good understanding of the Windsor Framework. I run a small business and therefore have to understand the general principles but talking to general public there is only very limited and very basic knowledge.” (68)

Finally, respondents were made aware that this was the final poll in this series and asked for any comments on the polling and whether it should be continued. The general view among the 65 respondents commenting was that they saw value in the polling for improving awareness of public opinion and establishing the accuracy or otherwise of politicians’ claims.

“Independent polling is essential in informing the public debate and improving understanding of non-partisan public opinion.” (39)

“Polling should be continued. It’s vital that citizens views are known and respected.” (55)

“These polls are important in establishing the accuracy or inaccuracy of politicians claims on these matters.” (165)

“I think such polling should continue, to see if this emotive issue gradually loses its prominence, letting us have a stable period of government to deal with more important issues.” (322)

 

This report is available to download here: 

Notes

1. Prof. David Phinnemore, Professor of European Politics, Queen’s University Belfast; Prof. Katy Hayward, Professor of Political Sociology, Queen’s University Belfast; Dr. Lisa Claire Whitten, Research Fellow, Queen’s University Belfast. 

 

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